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Preface

On a sunny Tuesday in October 2005, Dr. Daniel Callahan and I strolled through
the campus of the Yale Medical Center discussing the role of philosophy in bioethics.
Wrapped up in our conversation, we arrived at our destination and entered the Alder
Geriatric Assessment Center, where we were scheduled to meet with a physician who
specialized in geriatric dementia-care. At the time I had been interning at the Hastings
Center for Bioethics after having just finished a master’s in the philosophy of mental
disorder. Knowing that I was interested in mental disorders and personal identity theory
and that Dr. Walker held an interest in personal identity theory and worked with dementia
patients on a daily basis, Dr. Callahan had invited me to join him on his expedition to
Yale. Having commenced our meeting, we examined the different stages of dementia
and discussed a number of cases, discussing their philosophical implications and the
potential uses of philosophical theory in clinical practice. Raising issues regarding
symptomatology and the progression of the disorder, our discussion was centered around
the various ethical implications associated with different stages of dementia and how
even in clinical practice certain philosophical concepts such as ‘free will’, ‘autonomy’,
‘personhood’, and ‘diachronic identity’ (or identity over time) emerged, regardless of the
language used to describe them.
Discussing various philosophers, yet primarily dealing with the work of Derek
Parfit, an eminent philosopher and personal identity theorist, I had made some
suggestions regarding the constituents of identity and at which stages a dementia patient
may in fact no longer be considered the same person. In addition, I had suggested some
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existential explanations of suffering which may be helpful in providing a framework for
coping with suffering. My suggestion was that if suffering imbued the life of the
individual with some considerable degree of meaning it may have a value and, hence, a
doctor should take into consideration the notion that stifling such suffering may prevent
the patient from having a sort of existential revelation, so to speak. I went on to suggest
that if the suffering of the individual could be said to possess no such existential benefit,
then to allow its prolongation would be ethically unjustified. However, while my
philosophical reasoning, whether existential or analytic, was acknowledged as being
sound, the monkey wrench in the gears of each of my arguments was the religious
element; the religiosity and belief systems of patients stood in the way of my attempts to
apply sound and uniform philosophical reasoning to their cases.
With a religiously diverse inpatient populous, Dr. Walker informed me of how a
number of individuals and their families relied on their religious backgrounds and beliefs
when dealing not only with clinical ethical dilemmas but a plethora of issues surrounding
notions of illness, suffering, and death as well. It was clear to me that even if a
philosophical definition of the person was supported by logical proofs and was able to
theoretically resolve a number of problematic issues and even if an existential notion of
suffering seemed to respect the subjective realm of values, there was data being presented
to me which seemed to occlude their application in clinical practice. Evidence of Muslim
patients who held particular notions of the person and Catholics who valued suffering
apart from its ability to ‘existentially enlighten’ the individual had been presented to me - notions which drew my attention to the fact that in the theoretical realm of biomedical
ethics and in medical practice itself religiosity had been given a back row seat when in
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fact it emerged on the frontlines of the decision-making process of patients, whose wellbeing and opinions play a crucial role in both the medical and bioethical enterprises.
That which I found lacking in mainstream philosophical secular reasoning was an
ability to maintain a level of normative rigor while simultaneously being able to hold
substantive respect for the beliefs and convictions of those who would be affected by any
decision-making processes and the conclusions they produced. While I was aware of
religious factors in medical decision making before, that which became explicit was the
fact that religious pluralism presents clinicians, bioethicists, and policy-makers alike with
a real problem. After leaving our meeting and contemplating such issues, it occurred to
me that bioethicists are presented with the conceptually arduous task of attempting to
hold ethical and procedural standards and principles while simultaneously respecting and
seriously considering the religious beliefs of the patients whom such theorizing and
policies will actually affect. Hence, I decided further inquiry into the matter was needed
and, ultimately, set out to resolve such problematic issues.
This study is in an attempt to promote a more in-depth dialogue amongst
bioethicists coming from distinct disciplinary and religious backgrounds; to facilitate a
greater comprehension of the distinct modes of moral reasoning which come into play in
bioethical decision-making; and to explore the viability of forging a more pluralistic
conceptual framework for bioethical inquiry.

1
Introduction

Imagine for a moment that you are an observer in a room of the pediatric critical
care unit of a hospital -- a fly on the wall, so to speak. On the bed lays a boy who appears
to be breathing with the aide of a machine yet is otherwise motionless. His mother
strokes his hand, and his father closes a prayer book which he has just been reciting from.
Soon after, a physician walks in, holding a chart which bears upon it a number of test
results. As he converses with the parents, you learn that the doctor has performed a
number of apnea tests which have confirmed that the boy will be unable to breath
spontaneously if he is removed from the ventilator, electroencephalographic testing
measuring the boy’s brain activity which has resulted in a flat-line reading, and tests
confirming the absence of any cerebral blood circulation. Regretfully, the doctor informs
the parents that, due to their son’s profound coma, apnea, and the absence of his
brainstem reflexes, his diagnosis, in accordance with the State’s laws, is ‘brain death.’
The parents, rather offended, are quick to reply, protesting the doctor’s diagnosis on the
grounds that they, as pious Orthodox Jews, do not believe in ‘brain death,’ nor do they
believe that such a diagnosis should be equated with the death of a human person.
The doctor and most of the hospital staff believe that the boy is dead based on the
Uniform Determination of Death Act of 1980 1 , the criteria of which are: irreversible
cessation of all brain function or irreversible cessation of blood circulation. Given their
State’s employment of the above stated criteria, often referred to as the “Harvard
Criteria,” the hospital staff wish to follow procedure, consider the boy dead, and follow
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For more information regarding the Uniform Determination of Death Act see Kerridge et al, “Death,
Dying, and Organ Donation,” 89-94.
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typical hospital protocols for dealing with a dead patient. Uncertain of what to do, the
physician requests that a clinical ethicist be sent in to ameliorate the situation.
Armed with his knowledge of the widely accepted bioethical principles of
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice; medical policy, including a variety
of standards for determining ‘brain death’, all of which would have been satisfied through
the usage of the more conservative Harvard criteria 2 (Pence 2004, 45); and his arsenal of
philosophical logic, moral reasoning, and previously set precedents, the ethicist enters the
situation. After talking with the boy’s parents, he realizes that he will never be able to
convince them of the acceptability of any brain death criteria and that if the hospital
proceeds to treat the boy as dead his parents will be in a state of moral outrage. What
should be done? Who, if any one, is ultimately correct: the doctor, the State, the parents?
And how should the ethicist handle the situation? What factors should come to play a
role in his ethical decision-making: the secular ethical reasoning he was taught or the
religious beliefs of the patient’s family?
Moreover, what are you to do if you are a patient whose religious beliefs reject
the ‘brain death’ standard of death in the face of its widespread acceptance amongst
ethicists and clinicians? Further, in lieu of your religious convictions, what choices do
you really have when confronted with laws that, at first glance, seem not only to oppose
your beliefs but to force a label of ‘death’ upon your loved ones when you believe them
to be alive? Unless you live in New Jersey -- where a ‘consciousness clause’ 3 allowing
2

The three standard sets of criteria for determining brain death are, in order from most to least
conservative: Harvard Criteria, Irreversibility Standard, and the Cognitive Criteria. For more information
regarding the criteria of brain death see Pence, Classic Cases in Medical Ethics, 44-46.
3
New Jersey is the only state to hold an exemption to brain death on moral or religious grounds in a
statutory law. As quoted by Michael Grodin, the New Jersey statute of 1991 states, “The death of an
individual shall not be declared upon the basis of neurological criteria…when such a declaration should
violate the personal religious beliefs or moral convictions of that individual….” “Religious Exemptions,”
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people to object to brain death standards on religious grounds has been accepted by the
State -- the state, the hospital, or the individual doctor has the power to determine the
death of those whom your religion may view as still ‘alive’.
While the preceding case is itself fictional, it is based on a number of real-life
cases documented by Joseph J. Fins 4 and Neil M. Lazar 5 and raises problematic issues
which patients, clinicians, policy-makers and ethicists are faced with on a daily basis.
In addition to the case-based problems of dealing with brain-death, conceptually nebulous
and ethically difficult problems arise in relation to a number of other medical issues,
including psychiatric diagnosis 6 , treatment plans 7 , and others -- all of which call into
question the beliefs, values, and morals of individuals, which may in many instances be
in conflict with one another.
Furthermore, particular instances of ethical uncertainty, conceptual ambiguity,
and moral disagreement associated with religious differences, such as the case presented
above, illuminate a greater overarching problem regarding the methodological
foundations of bioethical inquiry: the fact that this is a secular yet religiously pluralistic
society whose laws, health policies, and ethical principles are to remain free of religious
convictions while adequately representing the pluralistic populous. In other words, how

(Journal of Church and State, 1994), 36:2, 7. These statutes are often referred to as “conscience clauses.”
For more information pertaining to the “conscience clause” of New Jersey see Kerridge et al, “Death,
Dying, and Donation,” 89-94; Veatch, “Impending Collapse Whole-Brain Death,” 18-24; or Chiong, Brain
Death without Definitions,” 20-30.
4
In “Clinical Pragmatism” (70-71), Joseph J. Fins presents a case in which a Hassidic Jewish child is being
diagnosed with brain death and discusses the problems which ensue due to the moral and religious
differences between the family and the clinicians.
5
Lazar et al, “Brain Death,” 833-836.
6
In “Neuroethics or Neuro-values” (297-313), Bill Fulford discusses the case of Simon, a secular lawyer in
the South from a Baptist family, who began to have revelations. Analyzing the case, Fulford proceeds to
question the status and criterion of delusions.
7
In “Cross-Cultural Settings” (6-14), Nancy Jecker and Joseph Carrese present cases illustrating the
difficulties of diagnosis and treatment planning when confronted with the cultural and religious differences
presented to a western clinician when dealing with a Navajo patient.
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are we to confront the problem of religious pluralism, on both the theoretical and
practical levels, in biomedical ethics? Ultimately, the questions raised by the
aforementioned example are: “Is there room for religious convictions in bioethical
discourse?” And if so, “How are they to be incorporated?”
As a response to the potential dangers and abuses of scientific and medical
advancements, bioethics has become a field of particular importance for contemporary
society. The rapid progress of modern medicine has provided both hope and despair for
many; along with the benefits of medical advancements come new ethical and moral
dilemmas. Emerging from a plethora of backgrounds, numerous bioethicists have
attempted to resolve these moral conflicts, clarify ethical ambiguities, and propose
universal solutions to the medico-ethical dilemmas which have arisen from technological
advancements in medicine. However, while medical technology has created new ethical
concerns, it has also opened up a new arena of moral conflict and diversity as distinct
groups respectively respond to such issues. Despite the variety of work that has been
done thus far, many religiously oriented bioethicists fail to seriously take into
consideration the beliefs of those coming from other religious traditions, while secular
theorists fail to take into consideration the pertinence of the religious pluralism which
pervades our society. While progress has been made in promoting interfaith and religiosecular dialogue and there have been measures taken to address religious pluralism on the
clinical, policy and pedagogical levels, the principles and theories that have traditionally
guided policy and doctor-patient relations are largely a product of quasi-legalistic and
rationalistic secular thinking. The problem is that, while ethical standards are necessary,
the individuals who will be affected by such policies and standards are often guided by
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their religious beliefs in their own ethical decision-making processes. In recent years
there seems to have been a renewed concern regarding methodological issues in bioethics
which suggests that the time may be ripe for a re-evaluation of the role of bioethics in a
pluralistic society and the role of religious perspectives in the bioethical arena.
Seeking to lay the foundations of a pluralistic bioethics, the aim of this study is to
explore the viability of such an endeavor and to provide methodological suggestions on
how we can pursue such a task. We will begin with a brief historical overview of the
relationship between religion and bioethics. Subsequently, a critical analysis of a number
of the leading methods of addressing pluralism in bioethics will be provided. Lastly,
methodological suggestions for creating a new conceptual framework will be set forth.
First, employing clinical case studies and drawing upon the bioethical work of
authors coming from distinct religious traditions and academic disciplines, this study will
discuss the differences in modes of moral reasoning found within pluralistic societies and
which enter clinical settings on a daily basis. The case work psychiatrist and medical
anthropologist Arthur Kleinmann, physician and clinical ethicist Joseph Fins, physician
and bioethicist Neil Lazar, medical anthropologist and bioethical historians Carla
Messikomer and Renee Fox, and others will be discussed to demonstrate the reality of the
aforementioned problems on both the clinical and legislative levels. In addition the work
of bioethicists such as Tom Beauchamp, James Childress, Robert Veatch, Daniel
Callahan, Leigh Turner, and Adam Hedgecoe will be discussed as a means of illustrating
both the marginalization of religious voices in the bioethical arena and the conceptual
difficulties religious pluralism has presented to bioethics on the theoretical level.

6
Second, exploring the critiques and methodological proposals coming from the
social sciences, such as those of Leigh Turner and Patricia Marshall; the contract
theorists, such as Robert Baker and Donald Ainslie; and the pragmatists, such as Joseph
Fins, this study will analyze the problems that arise when confronting moral and religious
diversity in a bioethical context. In addition we will examine the ability of these various
methodologies to adequately resolve a number of the aforementioned problems.
Finally, having highlighted both the benefits and contributions, and the potential
problems in both theory and practice, of each of the aforementioned schools, a
methodological model I am calling a “Pragmatic Perspectivism,” which attempts to
incorporate the benefits of and to avoid the problems with many of the previous
methodologies, will be set forth. This model is meant to serve as a potential conceptual
framework in which a bioethical theory for a secular yet religiously pluralistic society
might be forged. Drawing upon the work of Jeffery Stout and Ortega y Gasset, this
method adopts, adapts, and synthesizes the respective insights of the two authors as to
suggest an alternative way of addressing the problematic issues that religious pluralism
poses for bioethical inquiry. In addition, paying attention to both differences and
similarities, various perspectives on brain death, including those of Greek Orthodox
Christian theologians Stanley Harakas and Nikolaos Hatzinikolaou, Thomist philosopher
and Catholic theologian Jason Eberl, Confucian bioethicist Ruiping Fan, Buddhist scholar
Damien Keown will be explored as a means of demonstrating this new conceptual
framework’s ability to resolve some of the problems that religious pluralism has raised in
bioethics. These authors have been chosen based on the fact that a majority of them have
addressed the same bioethical issue of brain death which enables the possibility of

7
imaging a dialogue between these authors and facilitates a detailed comparison on a
specific issue. In addition, each of these authors has been explicit in identifying the
specific religious tradition he either claims to be representing or is drawing upon when
formulating his position. It is the hope of this author that this project will foster further
interfaith and interdisciplinary dialogue on initiating new ways of engaging the issue of
religious pluralism in bioethical theory and in clinical practice.
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Chapter 1
Religious Convictions
&
Bioethical Decisions

In this chapter I will discuss the relationship between bioethics and religion,
paying special attention to the problems which arise when confronting the phenomenon
of religious and moral diversity from within a bioethical context. Before doing so,
however, I would like briefly to summarize the role of religious thought in bioethics from
its formative years in the late 1960s until today as means of further grasping the severity
of the issue at hand, acquiring some historical insight, and better comprehending the
nature of the methodologies being employed in contemporary bioethics.

Religion’s Relationship with Bioethics

With a strong theological presence in its formative years, bioethics has always
had a relationship with religion. This early contribution of religious thought in bioethics
came primarily from theologians, mostly Jewish and Christian figures such as Paul
Ramsey and Hans Jonas, however even then such figures were in dialogue with secularoriented philosophers. 8 Despite the fact that both the religious and secular ethicists
shared the common goal of seeking universal moral truths, the languages employed to
express such universals were distinct and often hard to translate. Since the vocabularies
of the theologians, or ‘religionists’, could be highly saturated with religious terminology

8

For more information regarding the history of bioethics and the relationship of bioethics and
religion/theology see Messikomer et al, “Religion in American Bioethics,” 484-508, and Callahan,
“Universalism & Particularism,” 37-44.
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that could only be appreciated by members of their respective faiths, many of the
religiously-oriented bioethicists, such as Leon Kass and Robert Veatch, spoke a secular
language at the round-table of bioethics. In what appears to have been an attempt to
prevent miscommunication and misunderstanding, bioethical lingo took on a secular tone,
leaving those who represented both religious and secular strains of thought in a position
in which they could postulate arguments and defend their positions in a common
vernacular (Messikomer et. al 2001).
As bioethics developed further, universalistic ethical aims continued to dominate
the field. This eventually led to the rise of a variety of critics such as Joseph Fletcher,
who wished to focus on the particulars of situations, contexts, and cases (i.e.
situationalism, contextualism, relativism, and casuistry). 9 However, the failure of these
schools to provide adequate normative principles that could actually guide actions and set
the standards which were necessary in a field involved with policy-making led to their
marginalization. A universalist ethical agenda and the secularization of moral concepts
pervaded the field, eventually culminating in the popularity of Tom Beauchamp’s and
James Childress’s universalistic Principles of Biomedical Ethics, which will be discussed
in further detail at a later point in the study.
While the concerns of the particularists remained prevalent, universalistic
principalism tended to be seen as the most effective means of dealing with these
9

None of the schools of thought which Callahan has dubbed “Particularist” accept universal moral claims,
however, there are distinctions to be had amongst these various schools of thought. Situationalists maintain
that in order for a sound moral judgment to occur the particulars of each situation must be accounted for;
they do believe that a correct moral judgment can be made in regards to specific situations. Contextualists
claim that historico-cultural factors must be taken into consideration prior to a moral judgment. Relativists
claim that moral truths depend upon either a specific culture or are contingent upon the beliefs of
individuals. This is usually referred to as subjectivism. Casuists claim that moral decisions should be based
upon the outcomes and antecedent judgments of prior similar cases. They maintain that cases should serve
as precedents for moral decision-making and only when cases are unique should new moral judgments
come into play. Callahan, “Universalism & Particularism,” (Hastings Center Report, 2000), 30:1, 37-44.
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tumultuous issues. This has led not only to the exclusion of those employing religious
language, though not always those with a religious agenda, but also of those whose
religious belief systems and correlative systems of morality do not conform to the widely
accepted modes of reasoning present within today’s secularized and rationalized ethical
discussions from the mainstream currents in the field, as some such as Leigh Turner
would argue. 10 Despite the fact that in recent years there has been a growing
dissatisfaction with universalistic and principalistic methods, an exclusionary attitude
towards religious modes of reasoning continues to be held, expressed, and perpetuated by
a number of leading figures in bioethics. For instance, the preeminent ethicist and
bioethicist, Mary Warnock, writes,
Though religious beliefs may be the foundation for private morality and
therefore supply such morality with inviolable principles, it has no such
role in the case of public policy-making, even where the policy is
concerned with matters agreed to be matters of morality. It could have
such a role only if the certainty of the principles supplied by religion were
generally shared, or were held themselves to be enforceable by law (i.e. in
a theocratic state)….This is not to suggest that church people, whether lay
or clerical, should not speak on public policy issues….But moral
arguments if they are to be listened to in a democracy must be just that:
moral arguments. They should be weighed up, assessed and acted on
because they have persuaded on moral grounds not because of any
connection they may have with particular theological doctrines….
(Warnock 2005, 33-41)

This statement explicitly expresses the position in bioethics that there is a single mode of
moral reasoning, or at least a single correct mode of moral reasoning, to which all must
conform if they are to be heard at all. Such an attitude effectively endorses a belief in the
universal and neutral nature of a particular mode of reasoning. Moreover, it seems to
imply that ‘true’ moral reasoning is without context and disconnected from a given
10

Turner, “Bioethics and Religions,” 181-197.
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paradigm of thought, which as we shall see is a debatable claim. For many religious
individuals religion and morality are seen as inseparable.
To further illustrate the overarching problems of the under-representation of
religious voices in the bioethical arena and the necessity of current trends to incorporate
these voices into the biomedical ethical discourse, I would like to introduce the work of
Carla Messikomer, Renee Fox, and Judith Swazey who have each done work in the
anthropology and history of bioethics.
Demonstrating that even in a time when efforts to embrace pluralism have been
made, an exclusionary attitude toward religion in bioethics is still present. Illustrating
this point, Messikomer et al discuss and quote Childress’s position:
While religious viewpoints are important for “stimulating the public
imagination,” Childress said, he believes that a rationally based
philosophical mode of reflection is the appropriate set of premises to use
for his “model of public reasoning and justification” or “justification to
others,” if one is thinking about “how to help a …secularly-based public
institution…[in a] liberal, democratic, pluralistic society.” (Childress
1999; Messikomer et al 2001, 502)

Discussing national bioethics commissions, particularly the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission (NBAC), Messikomer and Fox document that recently an attempt
to incorporate religious voices has been made, however, he states, “the role that religious
testimony and thought played in shaping the NBAC report on human stem cell research,
and in the conclusions and recommendations it set forth, seems to have been both
marginal and nebulous” (Messikomer et. al 2001, 504). In addition, “In the report’s
finale, religion has been expunged by being reduced to ‘diverse perspective,’ ‘ethical
issues,’ and ‘moral concerns’” (Messikomer et. al 2001, 505). In a more optimistic tone,
Fox states, “The number of medical schools whose curricula include courses in
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spirituality have grown (Pulchaski and Larson 1998) and centers, institutes, and interest
groups on religion, spirituality, and medicine have been established in medical as well as
divinity schools of some distinguished non-denominational universities” (Messikomer et
al. 2001, 506).
Hence, I ask, is there a way to embrace moral and religious diversity in
biomedical ethics which can resolve some of the tensions which come with the pluralistic
territory? If there is a way of resolving the problems religious pluralism has presented to
the bioethical enterprise, what would it entail? And, if we are presented with multiple
candidates, which is the best one?

The Problem

Bioethics emerged in part as a response to society’s need and demand for the
existence of ethical restraints upon scientific and medical innovations and practices. In
addition, bioethics deals with a plethora of ethically questionable and conceptually
nebulous issues raised by such advances in medical technology. Today, bioethics is left in
a bit of a quagmire. Bioethicists find themselves in the difficult position of
simultaneously regulating ‘ethically harmful’ practices while attempting to respect the
diversity of the population which it is attempting to protect and represent in the first
place. The problem has been nicely stated by Daniel Callahan:
How are we as a community, dedicated to pluralism, to find room for the
different values and moral perspectives of different people and different
groups? How are we to respect particularism? [and]…how as a community
made up of diverse individuals and groups to find a way to transcend
differences in order to reach a consensus on some matters of common
human welfare? How, that is are we to respect universalism?...[For] There
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can be no culturally and psychologically perceptive ethics without taking
into account the diversity of moral lives, but there can be no ethics at all
without universals…. (Callahan 2000, 37-38)

Given this commonly held attitude regarding the relationship between ethics and
universals and secularism’s dominance in bioethical theory, the most widely accepted
approach to bioethical thinking has been universalism of the principalist sort -- that is, of
the sort which claims to have discovered universally applicable ethical principles which
retain their truth value regardless of socio-cultural, religious, or historical context.
Inspired by the synthesis of rule-base utilitarian and deontological thought, Tom
Beauchamp and James Childress, as noted above, have constructed a widely accepted set
of ‘universal’ principles, namely autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.
Despite their dominance, these principles and the theories employed for their creation
have received an onslaught of critiques coming from other universal-oriented schools of
thought, such as Kantians, Virtues Theorists, Christian Ethicists and other religiouslyoriented ethicists, and from a variety of what Callahan has deemed the "particularist"
camps and movements, mentioned previously. However, despite the criticisms launched
by the particularists their arguments often take a backseat due to particularism’s
potentiality for a creating a slippery slope towards relativism and the threat of moral
chaos which ensues.
The practical concern is that if morality is indeed culturally relative, or relative to
the individual as some postmodernists would claim, then how is bioethics to perform its
regulatory function of curbing potentially ‘harmful’ effects of scientific progress,
safeguarding the rights of patients, and discovering the morally right actions and ethical
behaviors which spawned the field in the first place? The entire agenda of bioethics
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would be undermined and the project of doing bioethics would fall by the wayside. On
the other hand, the theoretical concern held by the more philosophically-inclined
bioethicists is that relativism as a theory is self-negating, and hence an unsound and
absurd position.
Confronting moral diversity and religious pluralism in bioethics raises the spectre
that any principles which attempt to respect the claims of all religious groups will either
not succeed in achieving their intended goal or they will be too vague to accomplish any
substantive results, possessing no practical usefulness or applicable proposals. “The hard
part is to devise a theory that can readily join universality and the moral complexity of
everyday life” (41 Callahan). This is precisely the issue which we shall explore and the
very task at hand.
Since the turn of the millennium, there have been a number of attempts to devise a
theory which could provide solutions to the so-called universalism vs. particularism
dilemma in bioethics. As we proceed we will examine the viability of these alleged
solutions, exploring their ability to adequately resolve the problems presented to bioethics
by a religiously pluralistic society. After a detailed and critical analysis, it will be
demonstrated how some of the best attempts at resolving the problem of pluralism in
bioethics ultimately fail, or fall short of their goal. Therefore, after such an examination,
a new approach to the resolution of such problems will be proposed and defended in an
attempt to retain the insights of previous theories while avoiding their downfalls.
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Chapter 2
Moral Diversity
vs.
Bioethical Normativity:
Overcoming the Problem

At this point we will explore a number of critiques of universalistic and
principalistic bioethical methodologies and will examine a few methodological proposals
for coming to terms with pluralism in bioethics. The critiques and proposals to be
addressed will be those of the social scientist bioethicists, such Leigh Turner, Adam
Hedgecoe, and Renee Fox; the contract theorist bioethicists, such as Robert Baker and
Donald Ainslie; and the pragmatist bioethicists, such as Matthew Bacchetta and Joseph
Fins. Examining the ability of these various methodologies to adequately resolve the
aforementioned problems between bioethical normativity and moral diversity, we will
discuss the benefits and contributions, and the potential problems in both theory and
practice, of each of the aforementioned schools.

Ethnographic Bioethics:
The Social Sciences to the Rescue

Having been the least represented group in the bioethical arena, ethnographic
bioethics has witnessed a surge since the turn of the millennium. Bringing socio-cultural
and ethno-religious factors to the forefront, a number of social scientists have launched
critiques of the current state of bioethical theorizing. This type of bioethical inquiry
consists of individuals such as Renee Fox, mentioned previously; anthropologist Barry
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Hoffmaster; Leigh Turner, a scholar of religion and bioethics at McGill University;
Andrew Fagan of the Humans Rights Centre at the University of Essex; Adam Hedgecoe,
a sociologist at the University of Sussex; and Patricia Marshall, an anthropologist in
medical humanities at Loyola University. Voicing their concern over the failure of
mainstream bioethics to adequately recognize the panoply of moral claims coming from
distinct religious traditions, some of these critics have been rather antagonistic toward
mainline analytic bioethical theory while others have merely attempted to provide
correctives and to suggest a cooperative situation in which rationality and empirical
social scientific evidence are seen as complementary.
Nonetheless they are all united in their call for the further involvement of
religious voices in the bioethical arena, their desire to prevent the ethno-centricism which
ensues from the current principalistic and universalistic bioethical models, and their
promotion of raising awareness and understanding of the various belief systems and
modes of moral reasoning which pervade a pluralistic society like our own. Hedgecoe
states:
The social science critique claims that traditional philosophical bioethics
gives a dominant role to idealized, rational thought, and tends to exclude
social and cultural factors, relegating them to the status of irrelevancies.
Another problem is the way in which bioethics assumes social reality
divides down the same lines/categories as philosophical theories.
(Hedgecoe 2004, 120)

Also voicing his concern with the dominance of philosophical theory in bioethics, yet
going one step further to demonstrate the problems with universalism and principalism,
in particular, Turner states:
Although Beauchamp and Childress situate their principalist moral
framework in relation to the work of Kantians, utilitarians, virtue
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theorists, communitarians, and casuists, Principles of Biomedical Ethics
does not explore varieties of moral life as human experience unfolds in
particular social settings….Instead, the principalist model of practical
reasoning promotes a dualistic account of morality, whereby reasonable,
sensible “common morality”, is distinguished from unreasonable,
provincial “customary morality.” (110 Turner 2003, 11.2: 110)

Though speaking with distinctive voices, a common claim of the social scienceoriented bioethicists is that mainstream bioethics, for the most part, has failed to seriously
address the need for coming to terms with religious and cultural pluralism. Many of the
social scientists maintain that little attention has been paid to non-secularized religious
claims due to their incompatibility with secular rationality, and that many of the more
philosophically-inclined bioethicisits become wary of properly embracing pluralism due
to the moral relativism which it may be perceived to entail. In order for the variety of
religio-cultural voices to be heard in this field, they have called for an ‘anthropological
turn’ in bioethics.
One of the greatest problems facing the incorporation of non-secularized religious
voices into the bioethical dialogue is that “in many traditions…moral norms cannot be
discerned merely through sustained rational inquiry” (Turner 2003, 11.3: 187). Turner
claims that in religiously pluralistic societies we are faced with “multiple interpretive
traditions within which moral reasoning can proceed” (Turner 2003 11.3: 195).
However, from my own observations and analysis, it appears that thus far the only
modes of reasoning which contemporary mainstream bioethics has seriously considered
and attempted to synthesize are the various analytic modes of thought, presented by
science, philosophy, and law; essentially relegating religious claims to the realm of the
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‘unreasonable’, ‘irrational’, or ‘unjustified’, or requiring a secularization of their
terminology as to make theological arguments more palatable for a general audience.11
Bioethics must come to the realization that “in postmodern, pluralistic societies,
different webs of moral reasoning exist” (Turner 2003 11.3: 195) and do its best to
accommodate this phenomenon rather than sweeping it away with an allegedly
universalized rationalistic mode of inquiry and set of principles. Prima facie, it is not
impossible for bioethics to incorporate ethnographic data into bioethical inquiry in order
to promote a better understanding of diverse paradigms of thought, nor is it necessarily
impossible for bioethics to accommodate diverse modes of reasoning while still
maintaining an appropriate degree of normative rigor.
The neglect of the social sciences by mainstream bioethics may in part be due to
the fact that it has been ethnographic data which has given rise to relativism amongst
some anthropologists and members of the general public. Often philosophers view
relativism as a self-negating philosophical theory, for if all truth claims are relative then
there is nothing left to support the truth of the claim they are making. Relativistic
positions are usually construed as philosophical slippery slopes toward moral chaos,

11

However, while requiring that religious thinkers secularize their language prior to engaging in bioethical
discourse may appear to be a means of respecting diverse religious points of view while maintaining a
neutral platform upon which dialogue may occur, such a method is potentially problematic on a number of
levels. First, a number of religious claims may only make sense within the context of their respective belief
systems, which when expressed in secular terminology may be unable to convey the full meanings of such
concepts and may hinder an interlocutor’s ability to adequately comprehend the ideas being expressed by
those speaking from a religious perspective. Second, hermeneutical obviation aside, one may claim that the
very act of altering one’s language may overtime alter one’s mode of reasoning as well, for terms are
symbolic expressions of particular ideas. Subsequently, the usage of certain terms is correlative with the
expression of particular concepts. Hence, through the alteration of language we may actually run the risk
of altering one’s mode of reasoning as well, insofar as the language employed has a bearing upon one’s
mode of conceptualization and the constant usage of certain terms may actually reinforce the prevalence of
such concepts in one’s thought process. Ultimately, by secularizing his/her terminology an individual may
actually come to secularize his thinking, and hence leaving him/her in a position in which they are no
longer adequately representing the modes of reasoning and conceptual paradigms of the religious tradition
which they had represented in the first place.
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hence making them unlikely candidates for any field of applied ethics. However, the
findings of the social sciences need not necessarily be taken as endorsements of
relativism, but rather as data which point to real-life problems, modes of thinking, and
values held by actual persons in our society.
The problem lies within the conflation of empirical evidence and philosophical
theory. What the social scientists are stating is not necessarily a philosophical argument
but is rather a presentation of data acquired from evidence-based methodologies and is
representative of an empirical reality. Whereas relativism is a doctrine, moral pluralism
is a real social phenomenon supported by empirical evidence. While relativism may be
easily discarded in the ivory tower, the fact that there exists an array of moral beliefs
stemming from different modes of moral thinking is the socio-cultural reality that an
applied ethics must confront. Simply writing off a variety of moral beliefs as wrong or
false does not change the fact that the very people that bioethics is to be guiding and
protecting actually do hold distinct and often conflicting moral commitments. Indeed, in
clinical settings and in bioethical policy-making, conclusive decisions need to be made,
however, in doing so, the moral diversity of our social reality must not be overlooked or
marginalized when engaging in these deliberative processes.
What is needed, and I believe is becoming more prevalent amongst bioethicists, is
“a recognition that for many individuals and communities, it is these religious traditions,
as opposed to particular philosophical theories, that are salient when they address moral
issues related to medicine, illness, and health care” (Turner 2003 11.3: 184).
Recognizing such phenomena need not entail an endorsement of nihilistic relativism nor
does it necessarily require an epistemological judgment of the variety of claims being
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purported. Rather bioethicists must search for ways in which diverse perspectives can be
respected while still maintaining a normative structure of inquiry which will be able to
produce guidelines for action.
The ability of the social sciences to provide ethnographic data to those involved in
bioethical decision-making and policy formation can provide a platform upon which a
synoptic understanding of difference and a fruitful discussion, rather than a myopic
dismissal of alterity, may be had. This is where the social sciences can offer their greatest
contribution to the interdisciplinary field of biomedical ethics – namely, by providing
detailed descriptive accounts of religio-cultural contexts and the modes of moral
reasoning which such patients and groups employ. The “traditional orientation of
anthropology toward moral questions complements analytical approaches currently being
developed in bioethics by placing values and ethics squarely with the domain of culture”
(Marshall 1992, 56). As our society becomes increasingly more pluralistic, the social
sciences can benefit bioethics greatly by assisting in, and promoting, a deeper
understanding of religio-cultural difference. However, it is doubtful that the social
sciences can provide the entire solution to problem.
While the claims of the social scientists should be duly noted and their findings
should be given a higher degree of consideration in the field – that is to say if bioethics is
to be representative of the pluralistic populous, then the very descriptive nature of the
field which gives it its usefulness in addressing the dilemma of religious pluralism
simultaneously highlights its inadequacies to engage in the normative ethical inquiry
which is characteristic of the ‘ethics’ in ‘bio-ethics’. What is needed is a methodology
which can incorporate such findings into bioethical analysis yet which can also succeed
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in producing standards and guidelines; however, this is precisely what the social sciences,
lacking a normative agenda, fail to provide. Marshall states:
Though both anthropologists [social scientists] and bioethicists would
profit from an open exchange of intellectual ideas and methodology…the
relationship between bioethics and the social sciences as a whole still
remain strained and tentative…. (Marshall 1992, 57)

Hence, it seems that a discursive and dialogic methodological re-formulation of the initial
stages of bioethical inquiry will be our best means of addressing, and hopefully resolving,
the problematic features of pluralism, for such a method will be able to incorporate such a
plurality of perspectives into a single framework. Yet, it is only after a methodology has
been established that the contributions of the social sciences can truly take effect.
I would like now to turn our attention to some popular attempts to construct such
a methodology. In our analysis we will examine methodological attempts at reconciling
pluralism with the normative structure of bioethics, critically exploring their ability to
accomplish such an arduous task.

Bioethical Contract Theory

Pluralism is often seen as a problem for ethics in general and indeed there have
been a number of theoretical and methodological attempts to solve this problem. One of
the most influential of these attempts has been that of John Rawls. From philosophical
ethics to political theory, the impact of Rawls’ contractualism has been heavily endorsed
by those seeking to preserve principled standards while simultaneously respecting
diversity of belief. Since Rawls, other contract theorists have made their mark on a
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number of academic and applied fields. Though branded with a different name, David
Gauthier’s contractarianism has also been a major player in the field of pluralistic moral
resolution. Gauthier’s modified contractarian theory has been lauded as a means of
combating the ever present threat of relativism while simultaneously paying homage to
the moral diversity which pervades our society. In bioethics, both Donald Ainslie and
Robert Baker have employed contract theories as a means of responding to pluralism and
overcoming any relativistic tendencies which may emerge in a pluralist-friendly theory of
biomedical morality.
Although their proposals are highly distinctive, the contract theorists 12 and social
scientists share a common thread in their respective agendas, namely their critical attitude
toward moral absolutism, ethical realism, and the inherent universalistic agenda of the
moral theories espoused by various sorts of principalism. By seriously taking religiocultural and moral pluralism into consideration, contract theory relies on neither moral
absolutism nor a set of universal principles. Robert Baker has made this point explicit in
his call for a contractarian renovation of bioethics as a means of properly dealing with
postmodernity’s pluralistic landscape:
If international [or a pluralistic] bioethics is to respond successfully to the
challenges of multiculturalism and postmodernism, it must abandon moral
fundamentalism. It also must take stock of the three lesson to be learned
from the failure of fundamentalism: (1) the difference claim cannot be
explained away; there are fundamental differences in moral principles and
values both between and within cultures; (2) any attempt to obviate these
cultural or interpretive differences by postulating an acceptance of
common or universal principles at some more ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’
level is ultimately question-begging; (3) international biomedical ethics
must rest on a theoretical framework that can bridge perspectives even as
12

Though some may argue that contractarians and contractualists are distinct breeds of contract theory, I
find that these differences are minimal in the greater context of ethical theory. Hence, for our current
purposes I will be treating them as representatives of the same tradition, leaving any discussion of their
unique nuances for another time.
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it justifies genuine transcultural and transtemporal moral judgments.
(Baker 1998a, 225)

While contract theorists do indeed seek to forge a normative morality, it must be
understood that the moral codes of which contract theorists speak have to do with the
principles for cooperation that rational agents do, or would, agree to under certain
conditions. Whereas the universalists, or as Baker refers to them,
fundamentalists/absolutists, maintain that a given set of principles, norms and rules
should reign supremely due to their universality and immutability -- and hence, are able
to resolve various moral disagreements through appeals to a ‘moral law’ or common
moral frame of reference (i.e. Beauchamp and Childress) – contractualists are not
proposing any such set of absolute moral codes. In regards to coping with religious
pluralism in bioethics, Ainslie claims, “What Rawls helps us to see is that the task of
bioethics is not to resolve these disagreements, but to see what policy can be justified to
people despite their disagreements” (Ainslie 2002, 14).
Rather than proposing a definitive set of universal principles, that which the
contractualists have developed is a method for 1) discerning those terms of cooperation
that rational self-interested agents would agree are morally advantageous to all parties
participating in the cooperative endeavor, and 2) implementing such agreed upon terms in
an objective structure for moral systems. This is a method by which groups of
individuals may construct a set of rules based upon those values which they mutually
perceive to hold primacy in the face of an abundance of eclectic values. For after all,
“Why must others, in their struggles with reproduction, disease, suffering, and death,
conform to principles over which some philosophical theories happen to coincide”

24
(Ainslie 2002, 4)?

Contract theorists maintain that through a process of rational

deliberation each individual will arrive at the conclusion that the structure of the
contractual cooperative agreement is best suited to accomplish such a task.
The driving force behind such theories are the notions of bargaining and
negotiation; self-interest and rationality; and what Rawls referred to as “reasonable
pluralism,” or the idea that those individuals possessing conflicting, yet reasonable, moral
doctrines are able to come to the bargaining table and negotiate rationally with one
another. “Contractarian moral and political theory concludes that cooperation between
such agents is possible – despite fundamental conflicts of interests, principles, and values
– provided that the conflicting parties appreciate their own rational self-interest in
enjoying the advantages of cooperation” (Baker 1998b, 235). While a number of distinct
voices are to be present at the contractualist’s bargaining table, the conversation is
exclusive to the extent that those individuals or groups whose moral claims, and
correlative doctrines, may be judged to be ‘unreasonable’ will be prevented from joining
the negotiation process. Yet, how does a contractarian categorize a doctrine as
‘unreasonable’? Ainslie’s reply is that:
An unreasonable comprehensive doctrine leads its subscribers to reject the
idea of cooperation with those whose comprehensive doctrines differ from
theirs. It is people who are intolerant in this sense – in their unwillingness
to live peacefully, on terms of acceptable to all, among those with whom
they have moral disagreements…Accordingly,…the state [or in this case
the bioethical community]can legitimately take steps to prevent those with
unreasonable comprehensive doctrines from interfering with the lives of
others. (Ainslie 2002, 15)

How does this method function? And what forms its foundational basis if not a rationally
or divinely inspired set of universal moral truths?
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Meta-ethically speaking, having drawn upon the insights of Locke and Hobbes,
contractarians paint a picture of human nature, albeit a rather pessimistic one, asserting
that all agents have a deep sense of self which is comprised of a variety of conflicting
preferences and a self-interested motivation for action. Baker illustrates just how crucial
such a conception of human nature is to the contractarian paradigm stating that,
“[I]ntegral to the metaphor of the social contract is the contractarian recognition that the
interests of the parties who contract to form civil society are naturally in conflict (or, as
Hobbes put it, at war with each other)…” (Baker 1998b, 234-235).
Such a matrix of conflicting preferences leads one to a decision-making process,
which is based upon what Gauthier refers to as deliberative justification, as a means of
extracting those preferences that the individual deems to be of lesser value when conflict
occurs. Deliberative Justification states that an agent’s choices are justified if they
maximize the agent’s expected utility. This, he claims, does not depend upon any moral
considerations; for only in a community setting does morality arise. Gauthier claims that
rational agents will analyze their conflict ridden situation, realizing that it could be
otherwise. Thus, when placed within a community setting, that which each rational
agent’s process of deliberative justification shall conclude is the principle of Constrained
Maximization. Due to its ability for maximizing one’s own utility by means of
cooperation, such a principle would be accepted by the rational agent.
Thus, all rational agents involved come together to form a cooperative bargain.
During such a negotiation, each individual brings his/her primary preferences to the table.
In such a process, individuals will be able to discover where exactly their set of values
and preferences match, or hold similarity to, those of others. Negotiating will enable

26
them to formulate a set of values that they can all agree hold primacy over others (in
much the same way that the individual had done previously when assessing her own
preferences). That which is discovered is the link unifying the various subjective views
from which they may establish a set of terms that will be agreeable to all. Ultimately
what we are presented with is a negotiated moral order, which is flexible enough to
undergo change and be re-negotiated at a future time.
While the contractarians’ attempt to forge a middle ground between universalism
and particularism in ethics is laudable, there are a few problematic features of their
proposed methodology. First, like the secular fundamentalists and principalists, contract
theory relies on ethnocentric values and a westernized conception of rationality to do the
work of forging cross-cultural norms. Not all religio-cultural traditions value deliberative
rationality or individualistic notions of self-interest in the way in which the contractualist
paradigm requires.
Second, the entire contractarian method not only presupposes but is grounded in a
conception of human nature which may be unacceptable to the potential parties involved
yet which is integral to the functionality of the contractualist methodology. When one is
attempting to resolve the moral conflicts that arise in a religiously pluralistic society,
adhering to a theory which is contingent upon the acceptance of a particular conception
of human nature does not appear to be the most inviting way to bring individuals to the
bargaining table. A variety of both religious and non-religious conceptions of the human
do not view human nature as self-interested, monadic, and combative. Thus once these
allegedly innate traits are denied by certain parties involved, it seems that there is no
good reason to accept the social contract, for rational self-interest and conflict are those
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factors which allegedly motivate us to enter into a cooperative contractual situation in the
first place.
Third, contract theory’s legalistic edge requires bargaining and negotiation, which
may work well in some areas of business, law, and politics; however, when applied to
bioethics what contract theory ultimately asks is for individuals to bargain not with their
interests but rather with their beliefs about the nature of reality. Insofar as advances in
medical technologies have raised issues that have called into question those beliefs which
are constitutive of our perspectives of ontological reality, it is not merely a question of
negotiating the rightness of an act, but entails probing our conceptions of life, death, the
meaning of illness and suffering, and human nature. What the contractarian bioethicists
fail to take into consideration is, as Lisa Rasmussen has duly noted, that “There are many
metaphysical decisions that must be made in bioethics” (Rasmussen 2000, 375) and that
metaphysical beliefs are hardly as negotiable as contract theory requires them to be.
Accepting these theories necessarily entails either conflating interests/preferences with
beliefs systems and worldviews, or assuming that metaphysical and ontological beliefs
are arbitrary and negotiable, which is a question-begging claim to say the least.
Take a case of brain death, for instance. What a contract model of bioethics would
entail for creating a policy in regards to brain death is that the parties involved would
have to negotiate a definition of death; consequently, negotiating a conception of
personhood as well. Subsequently, it would ask the parties involved to bargain with their
metaphysical and ontological beliefs, essentially asking people to treat such beliefs,
which are constitutive of their worldviews and conceptions of self, as if they were mere
preferences and not staples of their conceptions of reality itself. However, if as Ainslie
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claims, “bioethicists should not be in the business of forcing their own private moral
views on others” (Ainslie 2002, 27), how could it be fair and acceptable for them to
impose their metaphysical and ontological conceptions of human nature upon others? If
contract theorists wish to protect individuals against being forced to accept a foreign
private morality, they too must be careful not to impose their own private ontological
views upon others.
Moreover, all metaphysics aside, without taking seriously enough that rational
deliberation is not equally valued across cultures, contract theorists endorse a single
mode of reasoning – namely, deliberative rationality. Ultimately this mode of reasoning
succeeds in occluding any individual who will not accept either the contractarians’ initial
premises or values -- namely that self-interested rational deliberation should be valued
above all else. The contractarian method asks individuals to negotiate their values in
order to arrive at a mutually shared set of values and norms yet presupposes that valuing
rational deliberation is a trans-cultural and trans-religious phenomenon before entering
into the process which is itself supposed to discover where such commonalities reside. It
presupposes at the outset that which is to be an outcome.
Despite the inherent flaws of the contractarian method, and its inadequacies at
resolving the dilemmas presented to bioethics by religious pluralism, it nonetheless has
its merits; namely, the fact that it takes empirical evidence of moral pluralism seriously, it
avoids postulating universal moral claims, and it focuses on a methodology for forging
commonly accepted norms rather than asserting such norms.
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Pragmatism in Biomedical Ethics

While some commentators such as John Arras would argue that pragmatism is not
entirely new to the field of bioethics for it held an influential presence in bioethics’
formative years (Arras 2001), there has been a recent resurgence in attempting to employ
pragmatic thinking as a means of combating the universalism and principalism which
came to dominate the field in the 1980s through the 1990s, and which still holds a
formidable presence.
Drawing heavily upon the classical American philosophers, these bioethicists
have attempted to employ pragmatist style problem solving in the clinic and as a means
of solving the problems pluralism presents to an applied field of moral inquiry. Although
the contemporary pragmatists in the biomedical-ethical circles have put forth theories as
diverse as their pragmatist forefathers, that which unites this camp of bioethicists is their
concern with usefulness, consensus and the employment of the scientific method for
testing claims, their avoidance of universal truth-claims, and their promotion of
democratic dialogue.
Now, there are those who may be labeled ‘neo-pragmatists’ who have also
recently joined the bioethical discourse, and also those who have been referred to as
“freestanding pragmatists,” whose influence has been felt more heavily in political theory
as opposed to bioethics. However, our concern at the present moment shall be with those
more ‘classical’ pragmatists, so to speak, insofar as they have had a greater presence in
bioethical discourse since the turn of the millennium. The two groups of this more
‘classical’ camp of pragmatists are those, such as Glen McGee and Jonathan Moreno
whose concern is more theoretical, dealing with principles and analyzing the state of
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bioethics in general, and those such as Matthew Bacchetta and Joseph Fins whose
concerns are case-based, addressing ways of bringing about resolution to moral dilemmas
in particular instances of moral conflict in clinical settings. The former have been
referred to as pragmatic bioethicists, while the latter have referred to themselves as
clinical pragmatists. Despite this distinction, they possess enough in common for us to
view them as representing a single movement within contemporary bioethics.
Like the contract theorists, the Pragmatists recognize the importance of moral
diversity, are concerned with the role of consensus and methods for achieving it and, as
their name suggests, are concerned primarily with the usefulness of theories, methods,
and principles as opposed to their ability to produce or discover absolute truthfulness.
Joseph Fins remarks, “As Pragmatists, we are content to seek workable, satisfactory
resolutions of pressing moral difficulties without any assurance or guarantee of getting it
right” (Fins et al 1998, 40). Like both the social scientists and contractualists the
pragmatists oppose the postulation of universal principles; however “pragmatists do not
entirely eschew principles…principles are taken to have functional, not fundamental
value in helping to shape inquiry as it progresses” (Hester 2003, 554). In addition, like
the contract theorists, what they offer is a methodology for creating norms rather than
positing either a set of norms or an absolute basis upon which moral norms should be
grounded.
However, where the pragmatists differ greatly from the contract theorists is that:
1) the conception of self they posit, if posited at all, is communal rather than monadic; 2)
and they take the lived experience of those who will be affected by the bioethical
enterprise as their starting point. Rather than beginning with theoretical abstractions they
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pay a degree of homage to the proposals of the social scientists by attempting to
understand the contexts and circumstances of those involved in and affected by the
ethical decision-making process. Whereas the contract theorists do not take the time to
comprehend the doctrines and contexts of the other, promoting a contextual
understanding of circumstances, as well as doctrines, is a driving force of the pragmatist
agenda.
Though some, such as Micah Hester, propose a communal conception of human
persons, they refrain from positing a detailed account of human nature. Hence, it is
dialogue rather than any conception of the self which is to serve as the basis of producing
bioethical decisions; this allows the pragmatists to avoid metaphysics at all costs. In this
sense, they present a functionalist camp of bioethical inquiry. “Pragmatists eschew
metaphysical, extra-experiential “objects”, but they do not deny objectivity…objectivity
is taken in an operative, not ontological, sense” (Hester 2003, 550). For the pragmatist
meaning and truth are seen as objectively real yet contextually situated in that they are
part of the experiential reality of those involved in unique situations, and operate to
produce real effects upon individuals.
Moreover, being pragmatists, they hold a concern with habits, viewing them as
norm producing features of selves, their contexts, and their communities. When
conjoined with purpose and intelligent foresight, habits can help produce outcomes which
are useful for addressing current concerns and can potentially create principles which can
help guide future actions without dictating absolutely what ought to be done. Rather than
beginning with abstract theoretical assumptions the pragmatist beings with the lived
experiences of the patient and clinician involved in the conflict.
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Further, they do not employ means of achieving consensus which are grounded in
self-interested deliberative rationality, as the contract theorists do. Rather, they recognize
that entire worldviews are at stake in bioethical dilemmas, and hence they promote
contextual understanding, attempting to avoid the legalistic bargaining and negotiation of
the contract theories. Elizabeth Cooke – referring to Jonathan D. Moreno, a Senior
Fellow at the Center for American Progress and Professor of Medical Ethics, History and
Sociology of Science at the University of Pennsylvania -- writes, “Moreno makes an
important distinction between agreement achieved through compromise versus agreement
achieved through consensus, where a transformation in understanding takes place for the
members (Moreno, 1995, pp.45-53)” (Cooke 2003, 649).
Now, to fully understand Moreno’s distinction, one must realize that the
pragmatist’s view of consensus looks very different from that of the contract theorist
insofar as it is understood as an ongoing process. Together with an understanding of
meaning and truth as contextual and a conception of the individual as communal,
consensus itself requires a continued and revisable dialogue constantly in production of
fallible results. “[C]onsensus understood pragmatically is not a thing to be achieved; it is,
instead, a continuum of process-and-outcome know as intelligent inquiry itself” (Hester
2003, 551) and hence, “consensus is not something sought, it is something produced”
(Hester 2003, 555). What the pragmatists ask of those involved in the dialogue is that
they be open to a transformation in their own perspective as to produce an actual
agreement with their interlocutor rather than a bargained compromise. “[C]linical
pragmatism operates through a shared process of investigation, planning, decisionmaking, and action in which all the stakeholders concerned with the moral problem
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collaborate to create an ethically appropriate consensus” (Fins 1998, 69). “These
methods are thereby democratic and dialectical, and aim to secure agreements among all
appropriate stake-holders, as ‘operative, but contingent, conclusions that must be
validated through experience’ (Fins et al., 1999, p.32)” (Bellantoni 2003, 617).
Much like the scientific method, the method involved in pragmatic moral inquiry
is reliant upon the notions of experiment, fallibility, and falsifiability, in addition to
discursive and democratic means. First, there is an initial data collecting phase in which
the facts of the situation are ascertained. These include understanding the medical and
diagnostic facts; the contextual facts of the parties involved, including societal cultural
and familial circumstances and dynamics; and the moral dilemma at hand, including the
potential solutions proposed by the different parties. Second, there is a stage of inquiry
and testing, in which moral solutions are tested against past outcomes and future aims of
the parties involved. This involves discussion, in which one may indeed change one’s
point of view, that will produce a mutually agreed upon conclusion which may be revised
in that it holds no absolute authority or universalistic privilege.
The methodological suggestions proposed by the bioethical and clinical
pragmatists appear to be approaching some sort of middle ground between principalistic
universalism and particularism, by retaining the use of principles while simultaneously
recognizing, and supporting a comprehension of, context.
In addition, this method engages the problematic issue of incorporating a variety
of religious voices into bioethical discourse by attempting to place everyone on an equal
ground, and encouraging dialogue over debate. Moreover, the proposal of flexible
principles meant to serve as guiding norms for particular cases as opposed to infallible
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universals does appear to resolve some of the tensions between respecting religious
pluralism while maintaining something that resembles a normative enterprise.
However, when one is addressing the issue of inter-faith and religio-secular
dialogue in bioethics, there appear to be a number of problems with this position. First,
while the inclusiveness of this method is laudable despite the pragmatists’ avoidance of
metaphysics and ontology, the fact that individuals are in fact faced with metaphysical
and ontological dilemmas when presented with bioethical issues seems to be inescapable.
Although metaphysical and ontological concerns may appear to be pragmatically useless,
questioning such issues as the constituents of personhood, that which demarcates death
and defining life will continue to be ultimate concerns of both the religious and secular
members of society when faced with ethical dilemmas in medicine. The case of brain
death discussed in the introduction, or any case of brain death for that matter, illustrates
how metaphysical and ontological issues are evident in particular cases of biomedical
ethical dilemmas, and how such concerns come to bear upon policy and the overarching
theoretical dimensions of bioethical inquiry more generally.
Second, despite the pragmatist’s openness to context and situation, it appears as if
the parties involved are almost required to undergo an alteration in their moral paradigms,
which would be a rather unrealistic criterion of any dialogical and multivocal
methodology yet which may easily find its way into the implementation of the pragmatic
method. Although it is also unrealistic to think that every party involved can have their
way without concession or compromise, it seems too idealistic and hopeful to build the
notion of an alteration of moral paradigms into the very structure of the methodology
itself, however congenial this might be to pluralism and to resolving the issues at hand.
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At first glance it appears that asking individuals to come to an understanding of the
contexts of others is necessary. However, positing paradigmatic transformation begotten
through dialogue does not necessarily need to be part of the fabric of a bioethical
methodology for it to be respectful of pluralism. Also, alterations in worldviews do not
seem necessary for bioethical theory to be conducive to responding to the variety of
beliefs arising from a religiously pluralistic populous.
Third, it might be argued that the pragmatists’ ethical and procedural proposals
are overly reliant upon scientific methodology and consequently are laden with the values
inherent in such a paradigm. At least some appear to neglect the insights of
contemporary philosophers of science, such as Thomas Kuhn 13 , who have exposed the
value-laden and metaphysically driven nature of the so-called ‘value free,’ ‘culturally
neutral,’ and ‘objective’ perspectives of scientific paradigms. Hence, to treat the ethical
dilemmas which arise in the biomedical sciences with methodological prescriptions that
stem from such sciences themselves may not be the best means of embracing the
paradigmatic pluralism which is presented to us by a religiously, culturally, and morally
diverse population.
To illustrate this point, take Fox’s discussion of a case presented in works of
writer Anne Fadiman and psychiatrist and medical anthropologist Arthur Kleinmann. A
severely ill Hmong girl enters into a clinic. Her illness is believed by her parents to be the
result of ‘soul loss’ caused by a malicious spirit, and they wish to treat her with
traditional herbs and ceremonial rituals. Conversely, the doctors have diagnosed her with
epilepsy and want to administer pharmacotherapy following standard procedure. Now,
the issue at hand is not whether the girl is actually an epileptic or possessed by a demonic
13

For a more in depth analysis of these issues see Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions.
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spirit, or both. Rather the issue which Kleinmann raises, and which both Fox and
Fadimann have duly noted, is that the physicians are oblivious to their own immersion in
a culture, namely, the culture of their profession. Kleinmann observes that, “‘As powerful
an influence as the culture of the Hmong patient and her family is on this case, the culture
of biomedicine is equally powerful. If you can’t see that your own culture has its own set
of interests, emotions, and biases, how can you expect to deal successfully with someone
else’s culture?”’ (Fox 2005, 1316).
Just as the doctor in Kleinmann’s case overlooked his own biomedical culture,
those implementing the pragmatic method in medical contexts may easily overlook the
fact that this method draws upon and adopts concepts stemming from the scientific
culture or context. This could lead to a situation in which the bioethicists who are
attempting to respect pluralism by understanding the contexts of others fail to take their
own contexts into consideration, which may hamper their ability to ameliorate the
tensions that they are attempting to quell. The pragmatists’ confidence in employing
scientific concepts in ethics may lead to the decontextualization of such concepts in
actual clinical situations and, hence, may result in a situation in which the mindset of the
ethicist resembles that of the doctor in Kleinmann’s case study. If, as Kleinmann notes,
we cannot expect such a clinician to successfully deal with another’s culture, how can we
expect such an ethicist to be able to adequately deal with the ethical problems associated
with pluralism? Patients coming from a religious context may perceive the pragmatists’
employment of scientific notions as an instance of science dominating ethics and may
have their reservations about such a method due to a potential fear of the possibility of
the marginalization of their own paradigm. If a patient’s religious beliefs prevent that
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patient from accepting the terms of the dialogue, how can we expect that patient to take
part in the dialogue and hence be a part of the process of ethical deliberation? Hence,
given such potential problems, utilizing concepts which are a product of the scientific
paradigm might not be the most effective means of facilitating a constructive dialogue
between religious and scientific perspectives.
Furthermore, in the case just presented, not only do we discover that different
paradigms of thought come to influence the perspectives of interlocutors coming into
moral conflict with one another and that all such paradigms must be recognized as
coming to bear upon the situations at hand, we also see that metaphysical and ontological
concerns keep cropping up and are hardly as avoidable a feature of bioethical inquiry as
the clinical and bioethical pragmatists would like them to be. We may not want to have
metaphysical or ontological discussions per se, however, issues of this sort continue to
emerge in medical contexts and continue to create ethical problems that may not be
adequately resolved unless we are willing to address the issues which themselves served
as a catalyst to the problem. In other words, rather than avoiding metaphysics all
together, we must ask ourselves if we can engage metaphysical issues without falling into
metaphysical discussions. By eschewing metaphysics pragmatists overlook issues that are
at times integral elements of biomedical ethical problems. Thus, the pragmatists’ partial
reliance upon the conceptual framework of the scientific paradigm in ethical decisionmaking and their desire to refrain from raising metaphysical issues in the discussions they
wish to hold may be a hindrance upon their methodology’s ability to adequately come to
terms with the unique problems and divergent paradigms that are present in bioethical
dilemmas involving religious and moral diversity and disagreement.
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Chapter 3
Pragmatic Perspectivism:
A New Direction for Bioethical Methodology

Now, that we have come to recognize both the need for ethnographic and
descriptive work, and the need for methodology, there are a few questions which our
critical analysis of the prior methodologies raises. How can we avoid the potential
myopia and absolutism of principalistic universalism? How can we supplement the
insufficient normativity of the descriptive work of ethnographers while acknowledging
their concerns? How can we make room for explicitly religious perspectives in bioethical
inquiry without having to accept such presuppositions as truths? How can we avoid the
rationalistic and legalistic pitfalls of the contractarians while still maintaining some
limitations as to whom precisely takes part in the discussion? And how can we refrain
from the over-reliance on quasi-scientific methodologies and the ideal of a
metaphysically neutral discussion purported by the pragmatists? Ultimately, how can we
achieve such methodological amendments while still maintaining something that
resembles a normative project that will allow bioethics to find that middle ground
between universalism and particularism? In this chapter I will put forth a methodological
model which attempts to achieve this goal. Attempting to retain the benefits of the
aforementioned theories I will suggest a new direction for bioethical methodology and a
new conceptual framework that is meant to serve as a platform for creating a more
pluralistic bioethics.
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Forging a New Conceptual Framework for a Pluralistic Bioethics

Having explored a few attempts to reconcile universalism with particularism, we
have discovered that tensions still exist and there are many problematic features of these
prior attempts at forging a pluralistic bioethics. Although we pin-pointed a number of
flaws with the methods of the bioethical and clinical pragmatists, the modest neopragmatism of Jeffrey Stout may speak to these problems and be of assistance in the
creation of a pluralistic bioethics. Hence, while I will not be employing his theory as the
ultimate solution to the problem of religio-cultural pluralism in bioethics, I would like to
introduce some aspects of Stout’s theorizing, demonstrate their ability to assist in our
endeavor, and, subsequently, apply them to the task at hand.
What we have discovered in our discussion of religious pluralism in bioethics thus
far is that it entails attempting to resolve and respect differences amongst a great deal of
divergent moral, metaphysical, and ontological perspectives while questing for some
common ground and shared guidelines for ethical theorizing in the biomedical sciences.
Thus, in addition to our adoption of some of Stout’s modest pragmatic conceptual
innovations, I would also like to introduce, adopt, and adapt some of the theoretical
insights of Jose Ortega y Gasset’s perspectivism.
Discovering conceptual commonalities between the works of Stout and Ortega, it
will be demonstrated how a synthesis of the insights of their respective theories, when
coupled together with the benefits of the aforementioned theories, may be employed in
the creation of a pluralistic bioethics. Thus, after a précis and brief analysis of Stout and
Ortega’s respective positions I will put forth a methodology that will be referred to as
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“Pragmatic Perspectivism.” The proposed methodology is meant to serve as a viable
means of adequately addressing the problem of religious pluralism in bioethics.

Stout
Jeffrey Stout attempts to demonstrate how it is possible to accept the phenomenon
of moral diversity without abandoning the idea that “moral truth” and “justified moral
belief” exist.

He argues that moral diversity need not necessary compel us to adopt

skeptical or nihilistic positions in ethics. Stout brings our attention to the fact that when
evaluating the truth value of a given proposition one must appeal to a set of other
propositions not currently under scrutiny. He argues that to test the verity of a moral
proposition X one does not appeal directly to the moral law itself, but rather to a set of
beliefs one holds about the moral law, regardless of whether or not the moral law actually
does or does not exist. Hence, there are a number of other non-moral beliefs which are
presupposed when evaluating the truth value of a given moral proposition (Stout 2001,
23). Subsequently, “What you can’t do, if you are human, is have your judgment
determined solely by the matter under consideration without relying on beliefs, habits of
description, and patterns of reasoning that belong to a cultural inheritance” (Stout 2001,
23).
Consequently, this leads Stout to draw a distinction between justification and
truth. He asks us to recognize that, despite the fact that to hold a belief entails accepting
the truth of that belief, one could be simultaneously wrong and justified in holding the
belief. Avoiding a definition of truth per se, Stout claims that the truth-value of a
proposition is a property of that proposition. Conversely, justification, unlike truth, is
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relational in nature; it entails a proper set of relations between a proposition, a person
accepting said proposition, and the cognitive/epistemic context of the individual. Given
the fact that in order to even test the verity of a proposition one is heavily reliant upon
other beliefs not currently being scrutinized, justification becomes highly relative to
epistemic circumstances while the actual truth of the proposition is not. “Justification in
morality, as in science, is relative—but relative to one’s epistemic circumstance,
including reasons and evidence available at the current stage of inquiry, not to the
arbitrary choice of individuals” (Stout 2001, 29-30). However, “This relativity does not
carry over…to truth. What we’re justified in believing…varies according to the evidence
and reasoning available to us in our place in culture and history. But the truth of the
proposition…doesn’t vary in the same way” (Stout 2001, 30). Therefore, if the
relationship between the proposition, the individual, and one’s epistemic circumstances
exist in the proper way, the assertion that this proposition is true can be justified despite
the falsity of the proposition, or even unjustified despite its truthfulness.
For example, Stout claims that if an individual lives in an era in which slavery is
both commonly accepted and not considered to be immoral and consequently that
individual believes that slavery is a morally permissible institution then that person’s
belief may indeed be wrong yet the individual may be justified in holding this belief.
Given the individual’s own experiences, the consensus of the era and the fact that the
individual has acquired the best possible knowledge afforded to her at the time, this
person may be justified in holding this belief even if the belief that slavery is morally
permissible is indeed false (Stout 2001, 29).
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Insofar as epistemic circumstances may indeed change over time, Stout requests
that we be humble. At a future time, either through familiarity with other epistemic
contexts or due to new evidence, or a greater understanding of various phenomena, we
may no longer be justified in asserting those propositions which we currently assert and
may in fact alter that which we currently take to be true.
Subsequently, his theory encourages us to engage in dialogue with others,
simultaneously recognizing that a change in our epistemic circumstances can lead to the
acceptance of different truth-claims. In this way it views consensus in terms of an ongoing dialogical process and presents us with a discursive methodology for normative
ethical inquiry. Such a discursive mode of ethical inquiry is able to incorporate a
plurality of moral perspectives into the process of creating ethical guidelines, or
standards. Hence, it may be able to assist in the resolution of some of the difficulties
which have been presented to us when attempting to deal with religious pluralism in
bioethics.
Recognizing that it is justification and not truth which is relative to time, place,
and culture, we are presented with a panoply of new options when analyzing moral
disagreements, for we can come to recognize that an individual is justified in asserting a
claim without having to resort to either an acceptance of the truth of his claim or the
verity of beliefs constitutive of his epistemic context. What Stout has presented us with
is not only a novel approach to confront moral diversity and a way of reconciling
relativism with absolute truth, but also a means of respecting the claims of others without
necessarily having to abandon our own conceptions of what the moral truth is.
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To elaborate, if proposition A is justified in relation to person P1 and epistemic
context E1, it is not only possible, but likely – given that justification is primarily
contingent upon epistemic contexts – that A could remain justified when asserted by P2
in E1. However, it also seems possible that a situation could arise in which A is not only
justified in relation to either P1 in E1 or P2 in E1, but could also be justified in relation to
P2 in E2. Although distinct, the beliefs which constitute an epistemic context could be
such that they may be used to justify a given proposition A, regardless of their
compatibility with the beliefs of another epistemic context or their ability to justify other
propositions which may be justifiable in different epistemic contexts.
Take for example the religious perspectives of a Buddhist and Christian in regards
to brain death. While these individuals will approach this bioethical issue from different
epistemic paradigms, they may in fact be able to justify the same propositions. As a
means of illustrating the mere possibility of such a scenario, I will put forth a brief
comparison of Damien Keown, a Buddhist scholar, and Jason Eberl, a Thomistic Catholic
philosopher.
Writing from a Theravada Buddhist perspective, Keown claims that “Buddhism
sees the human individual as constituted by their organic wholeness rather than by their
personhood” (Keown 2001, 141-142). Employing the notion of “prana”, which means
“breath” and which is translated as “vital breath” or “life”, Keown demonstrates how
justifiability of “whole brain” death is indigenous to Theravada Buddhism itself and that
secular arguments, external to the tradition, need not be utilized as a means of discussing
this bioethical issue. Keown writes, “The basic meaning of prana is ‘breath' and by
extension ‘life’…By prana on understands ‘vital breath’, a wind on whose existence the
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body and mind depend” (Keown 2001 149-150). Drawing a correlation between ‘prana’
and an ultimate concern with psychophysical wholeness, Keown endorses ‘whole brain’
death from within the context of a uniquely Buddhist paradigm of thought without
altering any traditional metaphysical, moral, or epistemological beliefs. Keown’s
position proceeds as follows:
The significance of brainstem death is not the loss of consciousness but
the loss of the brain’s capacity to co-ordinate the organic functioning of
the body….The test for this condition of disintegration is the death of the
brainstem, but it must be remembered that what is being declared under
this condition is the death of the human being. It does not follow from the
use of this test that a human being is regarded as in any sense identical
with or reducible to their brain, much less cognitive functions. (Keown
2001, 155)

Conversely, writing from a Catholic perspective, the Thomist philosopher Jason
Eberl also endorses the whole-brain criterion of determining death. Eberl grounds his
argument on notions of unity and a concern for the organism as a whole. Like Keown,
Eberl stays within the parameters of his own tradition (the Thomistic Christian tradition)
in forging an adequate response to brain death. Eberl states:
The whole-brain criterion of death has its roots in an understanding of death
being related to an organism as a whole.…In Thomistic terms, when integrative
unity has been irreversibly lost, a body is no longer proportionate for rational
ensoulment.…Therefore, the cessation of both a brain’s rationally-correlated and
biologically-integrative functioning indicates a rational soul’s departure as a
particular human body’s substantial form. (Eberl 2005, 42-43)

However, although similar notions of the wholeness of the organism appear in
both authors’ respective arguments, the ways in which they arrive at such a concept are
not only distinct but stand in opposition to one another. As a Thomist, Eberl is highly
concerned with rationality, believes in a formal soul which is distinct from the body and
which controls a human’s physicality, and holds that such a rational soul operates through
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a primary organ, which Eberl identifies as the brain. Eberl claims, “Aquinas understands
a rational soul to be the principle of a human body’s organic functioning and to operate
by means of a primary organ” (Eberl 2005, 31). On the contrary, Keown’s argument
holds no such concerns. From Keown’s Theravada Buddhist perspective a human being
is not conceptualized in terms of rationalistic personhood or metaphysical essentialism, as
Eberl’s appears to be. Consequently, given his position it seems that Keown would most
likely deny of the existence of a “primary organ” and a metaphysical “essence” of the
human individual. Claiming that “[Western]… definitions of ‘personhood’ take the
rational human adult as their paradigm” (Keown 2001, 27-18), Keown argues, “The
Buddhist denial of a self means that no one factor from the total physical and
psychological complex can be singled out as more or less ‘essential’” (Keown 2001, 30).
Keown goes on to argue:
The criteria supplied by our texts [i.e. Buddhist texts], such as vitality and
heat, are clearly of an organic as opposed to an intellectual nature. Death
is not depicted as the loss of intellectual functions but the biological end of
an organism. (Keown 2001, 154)

The proposition that “‘whole brain’ death is an acceptable means of determining
the death of a human individual” has been justified by both Buddhist and Christian
thinkers despite the fact that each is engaging the issue through the lens of distinct
epistemic contexts. Yet, although these epistemic contexts may differ, and at times might
conflict with one another, it has been demonstrated that there is a possibility that
conceptual similarities and similar values may be present in both paradigms of thought.
These potential similarities may be useful in promoting dialogue even if these thinkers,

46
holding seemingly irresolvable conceptual differences, had disagreed on the positions of
‘whole-brain death’.
Therefore, although two epistemic contexts may differ to the extent that they are
able to justify conflicting propositions, it does not necessarily follow that the two
epistemic contexts will never be able to justify the same proposition. In this way
members of a given religio-moral tradition who maintain a belief in the existence of
absolute truth -- even going so far as asserting the universal truth of their own
propositions and the universality of their own paradigms of belief -- may be able to
simultaneously acknowledge the justifiability of particular propositions across epistemic
contexts.
Person X from tradition X may perceive person Y from tradition Y as holding a
false system of beliefs, however, X can acknowledge the truth of Y’s proposition V
despite the fact that his/her reasons for asserting V are distinct. If both parties are
justified in their assertion of V, then we may begin to find a common set of guidelines,
not by employing a mode of reasoning foreign to both parties, but rather by discovering
conceptual links between their respective perspectives – all the while avoiding communal
attempts to discover the nature of absolute truth. The point is that, even if we agree with
Stout that justification is relative to epistemic contexts, there is no reason to reject the
notion that different epistemic contexts are capable of justifying the same propositions.
Consequently, there does not appear to be a prima facie reason to require an alteration of
one’s epistemic context from the outset.
Stout brings to our attention the notion that dialogue with others is able to produce
a change in our epistemic circumstances, which in turn can lead to the justifiability of a
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moral proposition which was previously unjustifiable in our prior epistemic context. “We
might, after all our dialogue with the dead or the foreign, decide to change our minds on
the moral issue in question” (Stout 2001, 32). While I do not wish to refute this claim, I
do wish to call attention to two important points. First, there are a number of individuals
and groups who do believe themselves to be in possession of absolute truths, and who
may be the least likely to display the humility, and willingness to change, that Stout
requests. However, this reluctance to change need not imply that their positions be
unrepresented in bioethics. In addition, I would like to note that an unwillingness to
change should not necessarily be equated with a lack of openness to dialogue. Second,
this notion of change has great potential to be misused and construed as a requirement of
our methodology. Discussing the prospects of a common morality, Stout states, “One
thing we will want to know is the extent to which the moral vocabularies and patterns of
reasoning employed by the two groups resemble or can be made to resemble one another”
(Stout 2004, 226). Now, I emphasize “made to resemble” for if coupled with the notion
of change the idea of making-to-resemble may be used to implement a requirement of
epistemic alteration at the outset of our discursive process. Such a requirement could
preclude an authentic respect for the other’s perspective as it exists in and of itself and
may result in an attitude in which the other’s perspective is only respected insofar as one
believes that it can be molded to fit one’s own conceptual paradigm. Subsequently, such
an attitude may perpetuate a belief that the other’s perspective must be transformed in
order to be conducive with one’s own mode of moral reasoning, which as we have seen is
not necessarily the case.
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A related potential danger, which I also wish to avoid, is that Stout’s theory may
be interpreted in such a manner as to imply that distinct epistemic contexts always justify
different sorts of propositions. In accord with Stout’s own denial of such an
interpretation I would like to illustrate why it need not ensue. What would follow from
this interpretation is the claim that it is only through alterations of various epistemic
contexts that we can attain an adequate means of reconciliation amongst various moral
perspectives and can begin to forge commonly accepted bioethical principles. Again, we
would be presented with a potential argument for the necessity of change as a
methodological requirement. However, as demonstrated by the previous dialogue
between Eberl and Keown, this need not be the case. Neither of the aforementioned
interlocutors altered either their epistemic contexts or their ethical positions, yet they are
still able to arrive at consensus through dialogue. Rather than amending their
perspectives in order to arrive at a conceptual common ground we are presented with a
bridging of two distinct epistemic contexts in such a way that preserves their
distinctiveness yet simultaneously leads to agreement. Our task is not to endorse
transformations aimed at producing an amalgamation of perspectives but rather is to
forge conceptual bridges between unique moral perspectives.
Now, while I have drawn largely upon Stout’s work, the conceptual framework I
wish to propose will diverge slightly from Stout’s theorizing. First, while aligned with a
number of Stout’s claims, I would like to refrain from a complete adherence to Stout’s
position regarding metaphysics. Second, I will refrain from adopting Stout’s views
regarding the status of the individual in a dialogical ethical process. Seeking means of
conducting ethical discourse regardless of one’s religious beliefs, Stout, like other
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pragmatists, wishes to avoid any discussions of a metaphysical nature. He wishes to
sustain the assertion of truth claims by interlocutors engaged in ethical discourse, yet he
believes, “You can have the concept of moral truth and an ethos of fallibility and selfcriticism…without adopting a theory that makes moral facts or “the moral law” capable
of explaining what it is for true moral propositions to be true” (Stout, 253-254, 2004).
Stout states, “Truth-talk is not an implicitly metaphysical affair, standing in need of
metaphysical articulation and defense” (Stout 255, 2004). Stout is not attempting to
debunk the metaphysical beliefs of ordinary religious persons but rather proposes that
ethical dialogue does not depend upon a shared religious faith or a common metaphysics.
He wants to promote constructive ethical dialogue despite metaphysical disagreement and
does so by leaving metaphysics out of the discussion.
However, although the purpose of our conceptual framework is not to solve
metaphysical problems and while it should not be construed as a forum for metaphysical
debate per se, metaphysical considerations are often of primary concern in bioethical
discussions and debates. In alignment with Stout, we must maintain that constructive
bioethical discourse need not be contingent upon a shared metaphysics, however. Unlike
other realms of applied ethics, not only do metaphysical beliefs commonly serve as the
foundations for moral deliberation but are often directly placed under scrutiny in
biomedical ethical contexts. For example, debates over brain death often entail
deliberations and beliefs regarding the nature of death and human personhood. These
debates raise issues that are not only contingent upon metaphysics but are themselves
metaphysical. Moving toward a pluralistic bioethics may warrant a circumvention of such
explicitly metaphysical debates, however, it seems that any fruitful dialogue will be
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difficult to achieve if the very concerns that prompted the debate in the first place are left
out of the discussion. Hence, all I ask is that we be careful not to overlook the
metaphysical component of interlocutor’s epistemic contexts and keep in mind that
bioethical decisions may at times threaten metaphysical beliefs. Thus, I request that we
engage metaphysical beliefs in our dialogues yet do so in such a way as to avoid actual
metaphysical debates regarding the nature of reality or absolute truth. In other words,
interlocutors should be able to lay their metaphysical cards on the table, so to speak,
without the aim of our dialogical process becoming a resolution of metaphysical
problems. We have to be able to talk about metaphysical beliefs without engaging in
metaphysical discussions per se.
Moreover, Stout’s theory tends to favor individualism, which may hamper its
ability to adequately address religio-cultural pluralism. Stout writes:
Ideally, it [a democratic ethical community] also invites its members to
resist their own absorption into the social mass and to cultivate whatever
virtues are required to foster the development of novel forms of action,
speech, association, and selfhood. Whitman calls this the “principle of
individuality.” A self-consciously democratic ethical community is aware
of itself as a community of individuals: each of whom has evaluating to do
that no one else can do on his or her behalf…. (Stout 2004, 282).

Now, Stout’s concerns are well taken, for he does not wish to see his theory collapse into
an authoritarian mob rule scenario, yet, we must be wary of the implications of requiring
something like a “principle of individuality.” We must refrain from postulating such a
principle and from over-emphasizing the importance of individuality as not to dismiss
those religious voices whose traditions may not place any significant value upon
individuality.

51
Regarding the status of the ‘universal’ bioethical principle of “autonomy”, what
would it look like if we were to include Stout’s individualism into our framework? Given
the claims put forth by Confucian bioethicist Ruiping Fan, I would like to note that a
Confucian family may not even employ concepts such as “autonomy” and
“individualism” in their ethical deliberations (Fan 2000). Consequently, a breach of
“autonomy” would not be an especially important moral concern of this Confucian
family. Now, would this mean that Confucians will have no part in the bioethical
dialogue? I think not. Requiring that individuality be incorporated into our conceptual
framework could potentially create an inherent predisposition towards individualism in
the method itself and would result in an unfair bias towards conceptualizing all of the
guidelines, which we are seeking to create anew, in highly individualistic and possibly
ethno-centric terms.
Regardless of whether or not a individual Confucian’s paradigm will or may
undergo conceptual changes and despite the notion that epistemic alterations may be
inevitable at some future point in time, as stated previously, such changes need not be
thought of as necessary pre-requisites for consensus. We should not be waiting for, nor
expecting changes or revisions in the metaphysical beliefs of epistemic contexts in order
for consensus to be construed as an achievable goal. Hence, the applicability of our
methodology must not be contingent upon one’s acceptance of individualism begotten
through a change in epistemic circumstance or metaphysical paradigm, which is
essentially what requiring a principle of individuality entails. As purported by Ruiping
Fan, community, not individuality, is the metaphysically significant concept in the
Confucian paradigm and is the primary thread in the Confucian’s moral fabric (Fan
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2004). Hence, if it is to be a truly pluralistic method, our conceptual framework must
come to respect this value-system as it is and not as we think it ought to be. Therefore,
individualism should not be given a privileged role in the inherent structure of our
method. Nevertheless, our inhibitions about requiring a principle of individuality, our
avoidance of emphasizing scientific methodology and our reservations about requesting
changes in the metaphysical paradigms of religious believers need not occlude our
employment of Stout’s theory of justification nor should they be construed as a call to
entirely exclude scientific and individualistic modes of reasoning. Rather, such
inhibitions are merely meant to serve as preventative measures aimed at securing an
adequate degree of respect for distinct perspectives.
Thus, by employing Stout’s pragmatic notion of justification, we can seek
justificatory congruities amongst varying epistemic contexts. In this way no demand for
change need be imposed upon conflicting epistemic contexts, especially when both
maintain absolute truth claims and an authoritative position in regards to their own
unique systems of belief. Consequently, it will be demonstrated how, when coupled with
an epistemologically ‘weak’ perspectivism, Stout’s notion of justificatory relativism may
enable the creation of a method for discovering a moral consensus, that avoids imposing
a single mode of reasoning, be it scientific or rationalistic, or a requirement of epistemic
change on the parties involved and which simultaneously humbles itself in regards to
moral claims of a universal and absolute sort.
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Ortega
Jose Ortega y Gasset has proposed a quasi-existential notion of self and reality
and a correlative epistemology which is grounded in the perceptions, point of view, and
the socio-historical context of the individual. His most famous postulate is “Yo soy yo y
mi circumstancias,” or “I am I and my circumstances,” which implies that the identity of
an individual is comprised of one’s physicality and one’s situated-ness in time and place.
According to Ortega, all one has as one’s individual reality is the socio-historical
circumstances in which one has found oneself. Hence one can only make sense of oneself
and reality through perception and inquiry which are constantly filtered through one’s
own situational and contextual circumstances. Insofar as each individual’s perspective on
reality is affected by the contextual and situational nature of the socio-historical world in
which one exists and with which one interacts, one’s perspective is constitutive of one’s
existential and experiential reality. Thus for Ortega, reality itself is the conglomerate of
all of these individual instances of the real. Now, I do not wish to go into great detail on
this point, for it is his epistemological insights which are of primary concern to our study.
However, it is from this ontology that his epistemological position, which has been
dubbed “perspectivism”, emerges.
Ortegean perspectivism claims that truth is “perspectival”, by which Ortega
means that truth is dependent upon the situational perception and contextual
understanding of the individual. However, Ortega has argued that this is not a
subjectivism insofar as he, like Stout, has postulated that an objective truth does indeed
exist, albeit an absolute truth which is simultaneously inextricably bound to individuals
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yet which cannot be reduced to a single individual perspective. Commenting on Ortega’s
philosophy Victor Ouimette writes,
[Ortega] recognized that for each man that which is the apparently the
same is in fact different and that there are as many realities as there are
points of view… and that each of these perspectives is an integral
component of reality [taken as a whole]. (Ouimette 1982, 47-57)

Providing a succinct summary of Ortega’s position Julian Marias writes, “Stated more
strictly: my reality is also reality; it is a part, or, better still, a constitutive ingredient of
reality” (Marias 1970, 379 [italics in original text]).
The aims of Ortega’s perspectivism are comparable to those of Stout’s
pragmatism insofar as Ortega attempts to overcome both a relativistic skepticism, which
reduces truth to the subjective or the circumstantial, and a rationalist universalism, which
fails to incorporate the subject herself and her contextual circumstances. Ortega states,
“The individual point of view seems to me the only point of view from which one can
look at the world in its truth…(II, 18)” (Ouimette 1982, 77). Consequently, the individual
is inescapability bound to her circumstances. Such a view echoes the claims of Stout’s
modest pragmatism, and presents us with a conceptual parallel in the writings of the two
authors. Stout claims:
We begin already immersed in the assumptions and precedents of a
tradition, whether religious or secular…Our starting point is not so much
arbitrary as it is inescapable: we are who we are, the heirs of this tradition
as opposed to that one, born into an epoch rather than another, our
intuitions shaped by the grammar of our native tongue. (Stout 2001, 120)

Like Ortega’s position, Stout’s position is not to be construed as a subjectivism
either insofar as, for Stout, the justifiability of one’s perspective of truth is not dependent
upon an individual’s arbitrary choices and imaginative ideals, but rather is a result of his
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circumstances. For a proposition to be justifiably asserted as true, its content must
considered within and in regards to the concrete circumstances of a given context (Stout
2001). For Ortega “there is a structure of the real, which only presents itself
perspectively, which needs to be integrated from multiple terms or points of view, and
which demands exactness in our reaction” (Marias 1970, 375). Now, while Ortega’s
proposals are highly metaphysical and ontological in nature, and employing them as they
stand could potentially entail an imposition of such beliefs and values upon others, it is
possible to modify and weaken such claims, retaining those elements which may be
useful when attempting to come to terms with the plurality of perspectives presented to us
by cases of religio-cultural moral disagreement in bioethics.
Drawing upon that which we have learned form our previous discussions of the
social sciences, we can view such empirical data as describing social phenomena which
are reflective of an unavoidable social reality. In this vein, we can modify Ortega’s
perspectivism, eliminating any references to a metaphysical and ontological structure of
the real, and come to recognize the multiplicity of perspectives of which Ortega speaks as
constitutive of a social reality as opposed to a metaphysical reality. Where Ortega claims
that it is where the various perspectives link up that we come closest to discovering
absolute truth, when amended in this way we can claim that bioethical consensus and
those ethical propositions which will be most likely to be considered acceptable to all of
the parties involved will be found in the commonalities, and compatible elements, of
already existing belief systems.
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Now, where Ortega’s perspectivism seeks to discover and explain the nature of
absolute truth, Stout’s pragmatism, while acknowledging the existence of absolute truth,
avoids discussions of its contents and the nature of universals and what they would entail.
I propose that, when applying Ortega’s idea of “perspectivism” to bioethics, we also
avoid such discussions by weakening his epistemological claims and re-directing our
inquiry as to focus upon the nature of socio-cultural reality rather than metaphysical truth
or epistemological reality.
Furthermore, we can avoid both the postulation of and the quest for any
metaphysical truths without having to necessarily eliminate discussions of metaphysical
beliefs. By conceptualizing divergent metaphysical perspectives as constitutive of our
social reality we can fully engage such perspectives without necessarily lapsing into
metaphysical discussions per se if we maintain that practicality, and not metaphysics, is
the driving force behind our inquiry. Moreover, by recognizing metaphysical beliefs as
partly constitutive of context and as partial foundations of epistemic circumstances, rather
than as mere by-products of such circumstances, we can view metaphysical beliefs as
integral elements of perspectives. Hence, I suggest a comparative exploration of distinct
perspectives which need not entail either an avoidance of or dismantling of the
foundations of such perspectives nor a direct engagement in metaphysical debate.
It is possible to explore conceptions of absolute truth and the ultimate nature of
reality without having the discovery of either as the intended goals of our method. Thus,
we can promote understanding and avoid postulating any requirements for change and
revision in regards to the metaphysical beliefs inherent within many religious paradigms
and epistemic contexts while still moving toward consensus.
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By focusing on the phenomenological reality of pluralism, we can search for
commonalities amongst belief systems and ethical positions. What we can come to
recognize as a socio-cultural and phenomenological truth is that there are different
perspectives regarding moral truth, and that each of these perspective is held to be true by
the individual who holds it. In this way our methodology would not view such
commonalities as evidence of absolute perennial truths but rather as pointing to the seeds
of consensus and the building blocks of a platform upon which shared norms and
guidelines may be forged in a pluralistic manner. Whereas Ortega holds that, given one’s
circumstances, point of view, and experiential reality, his perspective is true, by
importing Stout’s notion of justification we can amend this assertion by claiming that
such a perspective is justified and that the landscape of our social reality is comprised of
the presence of a multiplicity of such perspectives.
Hence, we can promote respect and open the doors of dialogue in such a manner
as to reduce the degree to which an imposition of our own values is being imparted upon
others. The synthesis and amendment of Stout and Ortega’s ideas just presented will be
referred to as ‘pragmatic perspectivism.’ Subsequently, it will be demonstrated that when
applied to bioethics this theory can serve as the foundation of a new conceptual
framework and more pluralistic methodology for the creation of bioethical guidelines and
norms.
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Pragmatic Perspectivism in Theory

Pragmatic Perspectivism, unlike other responses to religious pluralism, refrains
from putting forth a conclusive moral system and, while it recognizes the need for shared
moral guidelines in bioethics, it avoids any proposal to forge a universal morality. Rather
than positing a new form of “unbiased” moral reasoning or asserting a “universal” set of
principles, pragmatic perspectivism provides a conceptual framework for bioethics which
will enable the incorporation of varying modes of moral reasoning into the moral
dialogue and the deliberative processes of bioethical inquiry. Yet, unlike
contractarianism, pragmatic perspectivism does not request that interlocutors bracket
their values or religious beliefs. Hence, it does not endorse a rationalistic method of
reasoning which may potentially prevent the parties involved from employing their own
modes of moral reasoning. Rather it attempts to respect the modes of reasoning employed
by individuals possessing diverse perspectives and distinct paradigms of thought.
Pragmatic perspectivism views such divergent perspectives as part of the
constitution of socio-cultural reality. It recognizes the phenomenon that people hold such
divergent beliefs as true without necessarily passing an epistemological judgment on the
contents of such beliefs and correlative moral propositions. Rather than endorsing a
contractual agreement based upon a rationalistic methodology and bargaining, this
method seeks propositions that are justifiable amongst distinct modes of reasoning.
Consequently, it does not strive for any single objective point of view from which a
common morality capable of transcending difference can be achieved. Rather, it seeks to
promote discourse which is capable of discovering conceptual links already present
amongst divergent perspectives that can aid in the creation of bioethical guidelines.

59
Begotten from a multi-perspectival source, the conclusions of the method have the
potential to be more adequately representative of our multi-cultural and religiously
pluralistic society.
Pragmatic perspectivism is pragmatic in the sense that it emphasizes usefulness
over truthfulness, seriously taking into consideration the applied aspect of the bioethical
enterprise and the lived social realities of those whom it is applicable to. Furthermore,
this method aims at achieving consensus, yet recognizes that given our pluralistic social
reality the process of arriving at such a consensus must be on-going and dialogical in
nature. However, unlike some pragmatist solutions it does not necessarily require or
request an alteration or revision of the perspective which one holds to be true, for it is this
unique perspective which a pragmatic perspectivist is attempting to understand, respect,
and take into consideration. Rather than valuing the revision of epistemic contexts in lieu
of dialogue or asking others to alter their own perspectives, as do other forms of
pragmatism, pragmatic perspectivism requests that interlocutors seek to locate
commonality or compatibility amongst the various perspectives arising from distinct
epistemic contexts. Another distinction is that it refrains from equating science and
ethics, as do other forms of pragmatism, for such a move presupposes that all moral
reasoning resembles that of science. While both science and this methodology itself do
indeed strive for usefulness, and this method calls for a revision of the leading
methodologies in bioethics, I am not willing to claim that science and morality per se
have the same structure or teleology. Hence, we must not presuppose that each
interlocutor will hold a view of morality in which moral propositions are seen as being
akin to scientific hypotheses. Thus we cannot assume that they will be as willing and
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likely to scrutinize and revise their own personal moral beliefs, which they may indeed
hold to be absolute and universal, in the same way that our overarching method views the
ethical guidelines it seeks to produce.
Moreover, in this way pragmatic perspectivism does not require that the people
involved adopt a perspectival theory of truth nor is it claiming that those involved in the
bioethical discourse must abandon their own moralities. Rather, that which it is
requesting is that everyone in the dialogue comes to realize that others may be justified in
holding their views regardless of the actual truthfulness of those positions and to search
for similar values and beliefs inherent in each other’s paradigms.
Hence, even if one does in fact believe that holding his perspective is paramount
to the possession of absolute truth, that individual may still come to recognize that there
may indeed be some degree of truth, however minimal, to be found in the perspectives
presented by others. For example, if individual A believes that he possesses absolute
truth in his perspective, what pragmatic perspectivism as a method requests is that A
acknowledges that B may be justified in holding her “false” network of beliefs, and given
that B is justified to accept that there may be ‘partial truths’ (regarding A’s overall
network of beliefs and epistemic context) to be found within the perspective of B. In
other words, given A’s perspective and epistemic context, this methodology encourages
A to be open to the idea that certain truths may be found in the paradigms of others
despite A’s denial that B’s belief system as a whole is absolutely true.
It is important to recognize that pragmatic perspectivism does not deny that
A’s epistemic circumstances may in fact change once A is engaged in dialogue with
another, however, it refrains from requesting that such a change is necessary in
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order for consensus to be achieved. This together with its non-reliance upon scientific
methodology and non-privileging of individualism is where pragmatic perpsectivism
differs most greatly from the various forms of pragmatism which have previously been
employed as means of resolving the moral disagreements presented to us by religiocultural pluralism.
Yet, one may ask, should every perspective be given equal weight and be taken
into consideration when attempting to forge bioethical guidelines? Subsequently, this
individual may criticize pragmatic perspectivism stating, “If so, this would seem to be a
flaw of the methodology, for proceeding in such a manner would necessarily entail
encountering certain irresolvable conflicts, especially insofar as pragmatic perspectivism
refuses to require an alteration of perspectives and has postulated no universal truth to
which we can appeal.” In order to reply to such an objection, a pragmatic perspectivist
must concur that the incorporation of every, and any, potential moral perspective may
indeed lead to a chaotic and unproductive state. However, part of the problem is that the
criteria for eligibility in bioethical discourse have been highly exclusionary. Thus, how
do we determine which perspectives are eligible for the bioethical discourse in the first
place?
The contractarians have employed the Rawlsian distinction between reasonable
and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, with unreasonable comprehensive doctrines
being those which attempt to impart their moral systems upon everyone. Yet, as I have
argued, such a distinction seems to fail. Insofar as most religious traditions not only
believe in absolute truth but believe themselves to be in possession of such a truth, it
seems natural that such believers may attempt to convince others of the truth of their
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beliefs. Now, this may be construed as an attempt to impart their particular moral system
upon everyone, yet this need not be the case. The contractarian standard does not
adequately differentiate between attempting to convert someone or convince someone of
the truth of one’s claims and imparting one’s views and beliefs upon others in an unjust
and undue manner. Basically, it creates a slippery slope toward excluding the
perspectives of many religious individuals insofar as evangelizing is an integral part of
many religious traditions. Hence, while some standard needs to be employed, the
contractarian standard of reasonability does not seem to be the best candidate.
We may look toward Stout’s work when attempting to resolve this issue.
Examining some of the ramifications of incorporating Stout’s notion of justification into
our current methodology, I ask, what does the relativity of justification entail? Firstly,
being able to claim that one is justified in one’s assertion of a given moral proposition
necessarily entails an understanding of that individual’s epistemic context, for without
such understanding judging the relationality of the proposition, person, and epistemic
context would be impossible. Hence, that which is a prerequisite for one to be considered
a satisfactory and competent judge of justification is a degree of openness toward the
perspective of the other and a comprehension of the complexities of a person’s epistemic
circumstances. Stout states, “Communities take shape only insofar as their members
perform the work of mutual recognition…” (Stout 2004, 281). Hence, if we see this
group of interlocutors as representative of the larger community, then we can come to
recognize how openness and mutual recognition must play an integral role in the process
of creating principles which are supposed to serve as guidelines for the community as a
whole.
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Secondly, the ability to assert justification necessarily entails the ability to detect
its absence. Hence, the individual who is capable of being a judge of justification must
be armed with the appropriate criteria for determining the unjustified status of certain
moral propositional assertions without falling down the slippery slope of attempting to
judge the universal truth-value of either those moral propositions being asserted or those
propositions and beliefs which comprise the conceptual background necessary for the
individual’s moral proposition to have been asserted as ‘true’ in the first place.
Therefore, being a competent judge of justifiability will necessarily entail a minimization
of one’s biases from the outset and a temporary adoption of, at least to the best of one’s
ability, the mode of reasoning under examination. This is unlike the contractarian
solution, for the contractarian solution does not require that any knowledge of the actual
perspective of the other be had. Rather, it claims that any perspective which may be
perceived as being unduly imparted upon others should be eliminated from the bargaining
table, and consequently, the dialogue. Conversely, Stout’s standard of justification
promotes an awareness and understanding of the context of the perspective in question
and hence seems to be more conducive to forging a more inclusive standard of
incorporation into the dialogue.
Thirdly, valuing openness must not only be characteristic of one who is to judge
that which is justified but also of the interlocutors engaged in the dialogic process which
is required for pragmatic perspectivism to work. In order for such a methodology to be
successful, those involved in the creation of guidelines must be open to considering the
perspective of others and willing to acknowledge that shared values and/or concepts may
be had amongst otherwise conflicting positions. Hence, employing the more contextually
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sensitive notion of justification as our standard for entering into the dialogue, we
ultimately resolve the contractarian concern without having to resort to definitions of
reasonableness, or excluding some from the dialogue.
Furthermore, Ortega has claimed that perspectives which claim absolute authority
and neglect the perspectives of others are those which must be false. As a scholar of
Ortega, Julian Marias stated that for Ortega, “Falsity consists…in making a particular
point of view absolute; that is, forgetting the perspective quality of every vision” (375
Marias). Similarly, Stout writes, “Religious recognition of the faithful as a common body
and of the need to conform oneself to the best available understanding of what
membership in that body involves can be fleshed out in many ways, only the most
extreme of which deserve to be impugned….” (Stout 2004, 280-281). Hence, by
amending Ortega’s claim, changing ‘falsity’ to ‘unjustifiability’, we can incorporate such
a notion into our methodology. In addition, following Stout’s suggestion we may wish to
consider those perspectives that are laden with internal contradictions and inconsistencies
to be unjustified as well.
Consequently, it may be argued that those beliefs and attitudes which are to be
excluded from the dialogue are those that are laden with internal contradictions,
completely refuse to listen to the perspective of the other, and completely deny that other
perspectives will be able to justify some of the same moral claims as one’s own. We may
judge such a point of view itself to be unjustified, regardless of the justifiability of other
beliefs in its overall conceptual network, for given the nature of the process itself it is not
absolute truth which is being sought but rather where common conceptions of what is
absolutely true amongst distinct perspectives exist.
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Every methodology has its biases, preconceptions, and values. To lay one’s
values on the table at the outset is crucial for such a method of discourse to be
constructive. Hence, by entering into such a dialogic arrangement one is agreeing to
immerse oneself in a conceptual framework in which certain values and goals are
acknowledged from the outset. Pragmatic perspectivism presents a framework in which
“openness” and “consensus” are valued, the justifiability of distinct beliefs coming from
distinct paradigms is acknowledged as a sound possibility, and conceptual overlap is not
only valued and acknowledged as being plausible but is to some extent part of the
teleology of the interlocutor. Without the acknowledgment of these factors, a multiperspective pluralistic framework will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
Furthermore, insofar as this method entails coming to an understanding of the
perspective of the other during a continual discursive process and that one of the aims of
pragmatic perspectivism is to seek conceptual links amongst various perspectives
(whether such commonalities exist on the metaphysical or ontological level or on the
socio-ethical level) a key element of this process will be that of comparison. In other
words this dialogue needs to be a comparative endeavor which seeks to produce a series
of agreements and/or compatible propositions. Thus, in that dialogue often involves
comparison, and what we are dealing with here is the relationship between religious
pluralism and an ethical enterprise, I would like to briefly introduce some ideas found
within the methodological discussions of comparative religious ethics, which can
supplement our aforementioned conceptual framework.
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Consensus via Comparison
Discussing methodological issues of comparative studies, Thomas Lewis
maintains that a question should be posited as a means of framing the comparison, or in
other words a question should be raised as a means of creating an ad hoc and revisable
frame in which dialogue and comparative analysis may occur. He states that these frames
do not have to be grounded in anything resembling a ‘universal human experience’ and
may be as inclusive or exclusive as the particular situation calls for. He states, “…the
frame need not define a universal category of human experience in order to be fruitful for
comparing a number of thinkers from different traditions” (Lewis 2005, 229). Lewis’s
notion of employing a question is helpful for our endeavor, for often bioethical issues
may be easily presented in the form of questions, and insofar as that which we are
striving for is some common responses to such questions. Moreover, Lewis’s ideas are
helpful in that he recognizes that comparison is a necessary element of dialogue and vice
versa, and both dialogue and a quest for conceptual similarities are aims of pragmatic
perspectivism. Lewis writes, “Locating various views within this frame, however, is not
merely a matter of positing them as there but also entail situating them in relation to each
other….The process of situating the perspective in relation to each other presupposes that
the alternative views can be brought into some sort of dialogue with each other” (Lewis
2005, 232-233).
In addition to incorporating Lewis’s contributions to the field of comparative
religious ethics, I would also like to incorporate some of the ideas found in the work of
Aaron Stalnaker, who also has addressed methodological issues in comparative religious
ethics. Drawing heavily on Lee Yearly’s idea of analogical imagination, Stalnaker
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introduces the notion of “bridge concepts” as a means of conducting comparative studies
in religion. Stalnaker’s “bridge concepts” are chosen prior to the comparison and must
have both as little content as possible and analogous terms in each of the traditions being
studied. They create a basic thematic connection at the outset and may be enriched and
expounded upon as the study progresses.
Discussing Stalnaker’s contribution to the field of comparative religious ethics
Elizabeth Barre writes, “According to Stalnaker, ‘Bridge concepts provide limited,
thematic links to guide comparison, and yet are still open to greater specification in
particular cases.’” (Barre 2004, 17). Stalnaker’s idea of “bridge concepts” works well
with our pragmatic perspectivist conceptual framework insofar as that which we are
seeking is the link between perspectives. However, where Stalnaker is dealing primarily
with textual analysis, and hence proposes that such concepts be created in the mind of the
scholar prior to the comparison itself, we are dealing with actual dialogue. Hence, we
must seek to discover such conceptual bridges through the dialogic process itself. If such
an amendment is made to Stalnaker’s method, and we employ both Lewis’ and
Stalnaker’s ideas in tandem with one another, we are left with a means of implementing
our conceptual framework in bioethical practice.

Putting Theory into Practice
We are presented with a society in which bioethical issues are of growing concern
and in which specific modes of reasoning coming from specific traditions are commonly
employed as means of addressing and resolving such issues. Hence, we begin by inviting
a number of parties coming from a variety of distinct religious, cultural, and intellectual
traditions, to come together to engage in a series of dialogues on a number of distinct
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bioethical issues. These issues will range from matters such as brain death, on both the
clinical and policy levels, to the very principles or standards which guide the field itself.
Once a group of participants willing to engage in such an open dialogue has come
together, we begin the conversation by positing a specific question, as to provide a
direction and some parameters for our discussion and a frame of comparison for the
various responses to such a question.
It would be impossible to hold a constructive discussion in regards to the entire
range of bioethical issues, hence the question will be one regarding a particular issue,
such as “brain death,” or if need be a specific subtopic related to that issue, such as
“whole brain death” versus “cortical brain death,” or conscience clauses attached to
policies regarding “brain death.” To bolster this method Stout claims, “our concern is
practical and quite limited….The relevant comparison-class is relatively narrow….What
respects of comparison matter? Mainly, the differences most responsible for creating or
sustaining conflict and the similarities most likely to facilitate settlement” (Stout 2004,
229). In addition to merely positing a question and hearing the responses, once the
dialogue has begun interlocutors and moderators alike must be open to, and search for,
the appearance of conceptual links present amongst the various perspectives and
positions being espoused. It is crucial for each individual involved in the discursive
process to take part in the comparison. The reason is two-fold: firstly, different
perspectives may be able to detect different conceptual links, and secondly, different
individuals may be able to interpret those conceptual similarities differently, which
increases the chances of finding ways for a given similarity to be meaningful when
applied to the ethical issue under discussion.
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We employ Stalnaker’s idea of “bridge concepts” once a question has been posed.
There are certain concepts whose relevance will be immediately evident to those
participating, such as conceptions of “death” or “human nature” when discussing issues
surrounding “brain death.” These concepts may be tentatively employed as markers of
where to search for similarities and differences. During the course of the dialogue, such
concepts will become more refined and possibly altered. If at the outset we being with a
vague notion which is to serve as a potential “bridge concept” and we find that either no
such concept exists in one of the group’s traditional worldviews or that it does exist yet it
is not significantly valued within that conceptual paradigm, then such a concept must
either be abandoned or revised and amended if it is to serve as a conceptual link amongst
divergent perspectives.
For instance, if the discussion revolves around the very principles of bioethics and
one begins with a question regarding “autonomy,” we may find that such a concept is not
emphasized in East Asian societies and finds no substantive counterpart in the Confucian
worldview, per se. In such a case, “autonomy” must be either discarded or reconceptualized if it is to serve as a “bridge concept.”
Ruiping Fan, a Confucian bioethicist, discusses the inapplicability of the concept
of “autonomy” in both Confucian and other Asian models of bioethics. 14 He discusses
the emphasis that such religio-cultural traditions place upon the role of the family as a
single entity. Hence, he promotes a family based concept of ethical decision-making in
medicine. Fan states,

14

In a similar vain, Andrew Fagan, a British Human Rights theorist, also critiques the principle of
autonomy, demonstrating how such a principle is incompatible with most Asian, including Hindu, systems
of morality. For more information see Fagan, “Challenging Autonomy,” 15-31.

70
The Confucian way of life is familistic….Confucians hold that family
members should be interdependent, rather than independent of each
other….The family is central to Confucian moral and political theory. In
particular, Confucianism recognizes the family as an entity with social
properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of its members (Fan
2004, 185-188).
While Fan continually criticizes the Western notions of “autonomy” and attempts
to debunk universalism throughout his works, the idea of self-determination of a singular
entity may be found in his work if the family is conceived of as a singular entity with a
single socio-ethical identity and with the ability to partake in moral decision-making.
Given the Confucian emphasis on the family unit, a re-conceptualization of our “bridge
concept” may entail a broadening of the notion of “autonomy” as to account for families
as autonomous entities with the ability for self-determination. In this way ‘autonomy’
need not necessarily be expunged but rather reformulated as to more adequately represent
distinct modes of decision-making. Now, this is not necessarily an endorsement of such a
view of autonomy nor is it an assertion that every Confucian would necessarily accept
such a view. Rather this is meant to serve as an illustration of how we may go about
reformulating “bridge concepts” and attempting to forge some type of conceptual links
amongst distinct modes of thought.
As the dialogue proceeds, “bridge concepts” may be reformulated and new
conceptual links may be discovered, leaving us in a position in which we can begin to
posit new questions as to reframe the conversation. For example, if a Christian and a
Buddhist discuss “brain death,” we may come across concepts such as “respect for the
wholeness of the organism” and a concern for “multi-system breakdown,” as would be
the case if Greek Orthodox theologian and ethicist Stanley Harakas and Buddhist scholar
Damien Keown were involved in a dialogue on this issue. Allyne Smith discusses
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Harakas’s position stating, “Father Stanley Harakas, the doyen of Orthodox ethicists in
America, offers as a standard view the position that death occurs when there is a multisystem breakdown…. ‘Dying begins when interrelated body systems break down,
impairing normal living processes. Death occurs when the systematic breakdown
becomes irreversible and cannot be sustained’….Elsewhere, Harakas sees this systematic
breakdown as marked by brain death” (Smith 2000, 8). To reiterate Keown’s Buddhist
position, “our understanding of death must accordingly be as the death of the whole
psychophysical organism rather than any one of its parts….Buddhism would accept
brain-stem death as the criterion of death for a human being. Brainstem death means that
the patient has lost irreversibly the capacity for integrated organic functioning” (Keown
2001, 156).
Hence, questions such as “what is wholeness of the organism?” or “what is a
multi-system breakdown?” might be posited as a means of refining our interparadigmatic understanding and furthering the dialogue. Once such conceptual links are
found and some level of agreement is had, the initial question may be readdressed and
discussed in such a way that new modes of achieving consensus may be illuminated.
Even if there is an initial agreement on a particular issue, an ongoing dialogue is
still required. Even if all of the parties involved accept “brain death,” and again agree on
a subsequent topic, such as the “whole brain” standard of death, each party involved may
endorse “whole brain death” for different reasons, as was the case in our aforementioned
discussion of Keown and Eberl. Each participant may be employing distinct modes of
moral reasoning or distinct conceptual apparatuses, stemming from distinct conceptual
paradigms, in order to justify the very same propositions. Thus, to require a continuation
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of the dialogue will enable a deeper understanding of each party’s modes of reasoning
and conceptual schema and hence will promote a greater comprehension of the others’
paradigms and worldviews. When consensus is conceptualized as on-going and
dialogical rather than static and momentary, what we are presented with is a means of
furthering interlocutors’ understanding of the modes of reasoning and paradigms of the
others.
Furthermore, continuing dialogue even after a certain level of agreement is
achieved may potentially decrease the level of conflict present when discussing other
bioethical issues that the parities might not necessarily agree upon. Being exposed to
different ways of justifying a proposition that one already accepts as true may not only
give that individual new insights on the problem at hand but may promote dialogue and
understanding in an environment that is less confrontational than one where a serious
disagreement was had. Hence one may feel less inclined to put up defensive barriers that
can occlude one’s openness and willingness to fully understand and engage the
perspective of the other. This is where consensus must be seen as an on-going dialogic
process. Once such conceptual links are found in an agreeable environment when the
interlocutors move to a discussion of a topic in which they tend to disagree they will
already be armed with an arsenal of conceptual similarities. The interlocutors can then
employ these conceptual similarities as means of exploring their various perspectives on
this new and different topic. “Because the entire practice is involved, not merely the
ideals abstracted from that practice, a common morality can only be achieved piecemeal,
by gradually building discursive bridges and networks of trust in particular settings”
(Stout 2004, 226).
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However, one may wish to claim that even if consensus in regards to a set of
ethical guidelines is secured there may still be disagreement regarding the importance and
application of such guidelines. They may be interpreted in radically different ways by
different individuals and different groups. Firstly, in response to such a concern, given
the nature of the pragmatic perspectivist method there is an attempt to respect such
interpretive differences from the outset in that no one is required to alter or amend their
religious paradigm or modes of reasoning. The similarity and compatibility of concepts
must not be conflated with identicality, and consensus must not be conflated with
unanimity. By allowing and encouraging distinct perspectives to justify similar concepts
in their own unique ways, pragmatic perspectivism acknowledges that their will be
hermeneutical differences from the outset, yet does not see this as a threat to possibility
of consensus, as it is envisioned in this method.
Secondly, if we incorporate David Hollenbach’s notion of “Indigenous Pluralism”
into our dialogical process itself we may be able to allow for a degree of interpretive
differences and still work toward an overall general consensus regarding particular issues.
“Indigenous Pluralism” states that religious traditions must look within their own
paradigms of thought for ways of respecting the interpretive differences of other
traditions (Hollenbach 1998). While this is a novel concept, we need not alter our
methodological model in order to incorporate this notion into our framework. Prima
facie indigenous pluralism seems to be compatible with pragmatic perspectivism. We
can request that the various tradition’s present in the dialogue look for indigenous
concepts of respecting pluralism itself, at least in regards to a particular issue and given
certain agreed upon parameters. Hence, a concept, such as “hermeneutical diversity,”
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could potentially serve as a subsequent “bridge concept”. Thus, we may be able to move
toward the establishment of subsidiary principles or clauses which would allow for such
hermeneutical differences from within the structure of the agreed upon guidelines. In this
way a degree of interpretive difference could be allowed and supported by the various
perspectives and may be justified not by a foreign mode of reasoning but from within the
parameters of each interlocutor’s own epistemic context.
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Chapter 4
Pragmatic Perspectivism Applied

To illustrate how pragmatic perspectivism would look in practice, I would like to
examine a number of cases in which consensus on a bioethical issue was a primary goal
and in which tensions emerged as a result of moral and religious difference and diversity.
Afterwards I will demonstrate how if applied to such cases and utilized in these
scenarios, pragmatic perspectivism has the potential to both ameliorate some of the
existing tensions and to facilitate the attainment of the goals of such processes.

Real World Bioethics:
From Politics to Clinics

Case 1: Religious Voices in the Public Arena
Firstly, I would like to reintroduce a case raised earlier in Chapter 1, namely the
case of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission’s attempt to incorporate religious
perspectives into its deliberation of the issues of stem cell research and cloning which
Fox and Messikomer cite and discuss in their article “The Presence and Influence of
Religion in American Bioethics.” On February 24, 1997 the NBAC had 90 days to issue
its conclusive report on the legality and ethicality of cloning in general. In regards to its
report on stem cell research, “The NBAC convened a special meeting on 7 May 1999 of
11 ‘prominent scholars of religious ethics’ to hear ‘their traditions’ views’ about moral
and religious questions that this type of research raises’” (NBAC 1999, p.99; Messikomer
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et al. 2001, 501). Before discussing the case in any detail, Messikomer et al note, “The
NBAC has no religionist among its 18 commissioners” (Messikomer et al 2001, 499).
Discussing the format of the meetings and the intentions of the Commission,
Messikomer et al state,
The NBAC’s hearings on cloning and on stem cell research included
testimony by invited speakers from five major religious traditions:
Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Islamic, and for stem cell research,
Eastern Orthodox. The NBAC also commissioned a review and analysis
of Religious Perspective on Cloning by Courtney Campbell, a religious
studies scholar and bioethicist….[T]he Commission “believed” that it was
“especially important”—even “crucial”—that it “inform itself about the
range, content, and rationale of various ethical positions” regarding
cloning and human stem cell research that derived from “a variety of
religious traditions”…. The NBAC sought “to determine whether these
various religious traditions, despite their distinctive sources of authority
and argumentation, reach[ed] similar conclusions,” with the aspiration of
finding a “convergence of views across [them]” (NBAC 1997, p.7;
Messikomer et al 2001, 501).
However, it must be noted that NBAC still maintained a concern for the
separation of Church and State which is expressed in the report’s statement, “…in a
pluralistic society particular religious view cannot be determinative for public policy
decisions that bind everyone” (NBAC 1997, p.7; Messikomer et al 2001, 502).
From the outset there are two problematic features of the NBAC’s hearings,
which together may be summarized as a problem with both the aims of its intention and
its means of achieving such ends. The first problem is with its methodology and the
other is with its aims in general. Rather than inviting the “religionists”, so to speak, to
join their discussions as contributors to the dialogue and equal partners in the discursive
process itself, they were invited to give “testimony”. “Testimony” involves a speaking-at
or a speaking-to rather than a speaking-with. This testimonial method fails to actually
include these individuals in the conversation and hence excludes their perspectives from
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the actual deliberative process itself. Rather, these perspectives are objectified in the
sense that they become static objects of reflection by the commissioners and hence are
not part of the communal reflective processes which are taking place.
Secondly, there is a major problem with the intentions of the commission, which
in large part gives rise to the problematic nature of its method. The Commission sought
to inform itself about such perspectives rather than attempting to actually engage such
perspectives. In addition, the Commission itself aspired to find a convergence of views
amongst these various religious perspectives, yet did so without having the
representatives of those perspectives fully engaged as interlocutors. Having the
religionists as interlocutors would have been more fruitful in that they would be able to
clarify misconceptions and would be better equipped to determine where a particular
concept espoused by another was either akin or compatible to a concept present in one’s
own paradigm of thought. Without a full-fledge inter-faith and interdisciplinary
dialogue, consensus will be extremely difficult to achieve because dialogue encourages
mutual recognition of the similarities and differences and compatibility and
incompatibility of concepts and aims amongst paradigms.
Conversely, in a testimonial and informative context, like that which occurred in
the NBAC, the analysis and examination is highly superficial and one-dimensional. It is
superficial insofar as all the commission has to work with is freestanding conceptual
elements of each tradition which it then attempts to compare rather than witnessing the
interaction of worldviews and being a part of the relational process themselves. It is
one-dimensional insofar as it is only the commissioners who attempt to detect and
compare concepts. Given that the commission itself is secular it is highly likely that a
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predominantly secular hermeneutic, or mode of interpretation, was placed upon the
information acquired. This is a disadvantage when one is trying to find a convergence of
perspectives. Insofar as the religionists may be able to interpret the concepts of others in
such a manner as to illuminate modes of compatibility between their concepts and those
of others, which may otherwise have been overlooked, such a multi-perspectival
interpretive schema and mode of discursive interaction is crucial to the pragmatic
perspectivist methodology.
Further, the one-dimensionality present in the case of the NBAC is inherent in the
structure of the hearing itself, for it involved a group of observers (the commission),
situated as a subject viewing a set of facts or phenomena, which in turn are situated as
objects. Conversely, pragmatic perspectivism situates all parties involved in a dynamic
and discursive process that entails multi-dimensional subject to subject relations and the
consideration of many distinct interpretive stances, both of which the NBAC hearings
lacked. It is not a surprise then that what Messikomer et al reports is that not much
progress was made. Messikomer et al state,
Virtually the only insights that the NBAC seems to have derived and
utilized from the religious testimony it heard regarding the prospect of
human cloning were equivocal at best. They were summarized in the
recommendation section of the cloning report in the following way:
“Religious positions on human cloning are pluralistic in their premises,
modes of argument and conclusions. Nevertheless, several major themes
are prominent in Jewish, Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Islamic
positions, including responsible human dominion over nature, human
dignity and destiny, procreation, and family life….” (NBAC 1997, pp.
103-104)….Conceptually and empirically, the inconclusive conclusions
about religious perspectives on cloning at which the NBAC arrived fell far
short of identifying common grounds for reaching the “convergence of
religious view” to which they had aspired. (Messikomer et al 2001, 503)
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If pragmatic perspectivism were applied to the above situation involving
religionists and the NBAC, both the commissioners and religionists would have had an
equal voice in the matter in that all parties would have been situated as interlocutors in a
greater dialogue revolving around a single question, in this case “Is the cloning of a
human individual an ethically permissible act?” Despite a motley assortment of
responses comprised of “yes”, “no”, and “sometimes, depending on the situation,” the
dialogue would not come to a halt. Rather, the question as to why each party gave the
response they did would be probed further in an attempt to discover some commonly
shared concepts, be they directly related to cloning per se or not.
Take for example the concept of “human dignity,” which the Commission itself
found to be of common concern. This may then be employed as a “bridge concept,” so
we could move to questions such as “what does human dignity entail,” “why is human
dignity important to you,” and “in what manner do you see cloning as either compatible
or incompatible with your conception of human dignity?” Now, such questions would not
be presented all at once but rather one by one with ample time given for deliberation and
discussion to be had as to promote a mutual recognition of the modes of reasoning
employed by each person. That which would be given attention is not only the distinct
interpretations of human nature which the participants espoused but also the distinct
comparative interpretations of each interlocutor as well. Having a number of
perspectives present in the comparative process is as important as having many
perspectives present their views on a given topic. Different interpretive lenses may not
only be a cause of disagreement but may be able to provide new insights as to where
commonalities exist and where conceptual bridges may be formed. Different interpreters
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may perceive different conceptual links amongst the various perspectives and hence, may
increase the chances of arriving at consensus.
We can not expect consensus to be achieved after a body of ‘impartial’ observes
examines the brief testimonies of a few individuals over a relatively short period of time.
If the aim is consensus or conceptual convergence, which indeed it was in the case of the
NBAC, an on-going process of dialogue, in which no single mode of reasoning is given
authority or privilege, must be initiated. Otherwise, all we are presented with is a failed
attempt at coming to terms with pluralism that is unable to produce substantive
resolutions to the problems of religio-moral diversity.

Case 2: Religious Belief in the Clinic
Now, in regards to the problems and issues which arise in a clinical setting,
pragmatic perspectivism recognizes that many of the moral dilemmas and ethical
disagreements which occur in clinical settings are a product of the clash between
divergent moral systems and worldviews. Thus, universal principles and rationalistic
modes of moral deliberation may not always be the best means of ameliorating the
tensions in such cases for they themselves are representative of a single moral paradigm
and mode of reasoning. By attempting to create policies, guidelines, and standards which
are more adequately representative of society’s moral diversity, pragmatic perspectivism
aims to minimize, though it may not always resolve, the potential conflicts in particular
cases through a top down approach. This approach attempts to provide flexible starting
points for moral deliberation which are themselves begotten through a bottom-up
dialogical exchange amongst diverse perspectives. Moreover, it is intended to serve as a
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framework which may help ensure and facilitate an atmosphere of openness to diverse
religious points of view in particular clinical situations.
In Clinical Pragmatism and Difference, Joseph Fins presents a case involving a
religious objection to brain death and goes on to demonstrate how clinical pragmatism
was used to ameliorate some of the tensions that arose. Before discussing the details of
the case however, Fins notes that he practices medicine in New York, a state where
concessions are made in regards to religious objections to brain death and an area of the
country which attempts to accommodate divergent religious beliefs. Fins states,

The New York State Department of Health developed a policy on brain
death. It requires that hospitals establish a ‘procedure for the reasonable
individual’s religious or moral objection to the determination as expressed
by the individual, or by the next of kin or other person closest to the
individual.’ Although New York law deviates from the Uniform
determination of Death Act accepted in 48 states, the law in New Jersey is
even more expansive with respect to the accommodation of religious
objections to brain death determinations. (Fins 1998, 70-71)

Fins proceeds to report that a Hassidic Jewish family’s two-year-old son Jacob
had a brain tumor, for which he underwent chemotherapy. Subsequently, Jacob
developed a herniation in his brain. The herniation progressed, which led doctors to
suspect that he might be brain dead. In order to determine brain death, two apnea tests
are required. The first one was performed and the child showed no signs of spontaneous
breathing. However, before the second apnea test was performed the boy’s mother
objected to such a test on religious grounds. As Hasidic Jews the woman and her family
did not accept brain death as a demarcation of death. At this point Fins notes that the boy
had not been declared to be legally brain dead yet due to the lack of a second
confirmatory apnea test. Fins reports that in order to better comprehend the patient’s
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perspective, he himself began to consider the ambiguity of brain death and began to
familiarize himself with the patient’s religious and cultural traditions. He proposes that
this be done either through self-study or through the incorporation of another member of
the patient’s religious group, who is knowledgeable about such matters, into the dialogue
(Fins 1998, 70-72).
Subsequently, Fins and the family held a series of meetings. Fins states, “In those
meetings we sought to identify the range of moral considerations that might be common
to our secular approach and their religiously informed view of the child’s situation…”
(Fins 1998, 73). As the meetings continued they realized that defining death and the
question as to the status of the boy were not resolvable. Hence, they proceeded to reframe
the problem, Fins writes, “We asked how the Jewish law would interpret the conflicting
mandates to preserve life and not prolong the dying process. Instead of struggling over a
definition of brain death, we engaged the observant family, on their own terms…” (Fins
1998, 73). Ultimately, the family agreed to withdraw some of the elements of the ICU
support and the boy died as a result of cardiopulmonary arrest (Fins 1998, 72-73).
At this point one may observe that the methodology of pragmatic perspectivism
resembles that of clinical pragmatism. The main difference, however, is that whereas
clinical pragmatism is a methodology for achieving consensus between individual
patients and individual doctors, as illustrated by the aforementioned case, pragmatic
perspectivism proposes a methodology for creating the ethical guidelines and policies
which are to be upheld by the clinic itself. Despite a number of theoretical differences, if
it were to be amended and applied to particular clinical situations pragmatic
perspectivism would indeed resemble what Joseph Fins has dubbed “Clinical
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Pragmatism” when put into practice. However, it must be made clear that this is not the
primary intention or purpose of pragmatic perspectivism. In addition, this should not be
taken as an endorsement of the outcomes of and decisions made in this particular case.
Rather, this is merely an exploration of an actual case in which religious differences
presented a problem for bioethical decision-making and in which a form of pragmatic
dialogue was implemented as a means of resolving the problem.
One may ask, “why not simply amend clinical pragmatism so that it may be
applied on the policy level and in regards to the guiding principles themselves?” In
response, while clinical pragmatism is well-suited for the task it has set out to accomplish
-- namely, to ameliorate tensions and prevent conflicts that arise in individual cases -- it is
not well-suited to achieve the goals of pragmatic perspectivism; although the two may
work in tandem as supplementary approaches.
Firstly, by its very nature, clinical pragmatism is concerned with individual cases
and is strictly a case by case methodological approach. It applies the medical diagnostic
framework of differential diagnosis to individual moral cases. Fins states,
Clinical pragmatism uses an inductive method of problem solving that is
analogous to differential diagnosis. In the process of differential diagnosis
clinicians translate the details of a specific patient’s history and physical
examination into a range of plausible and generalizible diagnoses that will
allow therapeutic interventions. Analogously, clinical pragmatism
operates through a shared process of investigation, planning, decisionmaking, and action in which all the stakeholders concerned with the moral
problem collaborate to create an ethically appropriate consensus. (Fins
1998, 69)

Secondly, it seems too idealistic to presuppose that every doctor will be both
willing and able to undergo thorough self-study of the patient’s tradition or that a member
of that patient’s faith who is knowledgeable about his tradition’s views on brain death or
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other bioethical issues will always be available. Hence, this is where pragmatic
perspectivism endorses having a number of different perspectives present on the actual
ethics board of the hospital itself. Yet, this need not necessarily entail that an Orthodox
Jewish theologian be a member of every hospital’s ethics committee. Rather it suggests
that someone who is knowledgeable of Orthodox Jewish perspectives, and also people
familiar with other religious perspectives for that matter, be members of such a
committee or that the committee is at least willing to consult with such individuals.
Additionally, it seems that the need for and usefulness of a highly pluralistic ethics
committee would be greater for hospitals located in more diverse areas. Subsequently, it
may be the case that in more religiously and culturally homogenous areas it might be
unnecessary for hospitals to have such diverse ethics committees.
Moreover, even where pluralistic ethics committees would be beneficial, I am not
claiming that in each particular scenario members of every tradition need to be involved
in the decision-making process. Rather, it is meant to ensure that the committee has had
familiarity with a number of perspectives prior to the actual clinical dilemma and that
openness to distinct perspectives is maintained. Moreover, it is meant to help ensure that
religious beliefs are taken seriously in clinical situations.
Lastly, clinical pragmatism presupposes the existence of generalized ethical
diagnoses, so to speak, and seeks situational consensus on these pre-established ethical
principles. In addition, it presupposes that the policies of the region and/or hospital in
which this method is to be practiced are conducive with the principles and values of the
methodology itself. Conversely, pragmatic perspectivism seeks to create more pluralistic
guidelines. Pragmatic perspectivism is meant to serve as a means of creating the very
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ethical generalizations, guidelines, policies and pluralistic atmosphere which clinical
pragmatism seems to presuppose.
While this is not an attempt to synthesize pragmatic perspectivism and clinical
pragmatism nor is it necessarily an endorsement of clinical pragmatism, it is being
suggested that pragmatic perspectivism and clinical pragmatism may be complementary
methodologies. By creating more pluralistic generalized guidelines, pragmatic
perspectivism may give clinical pragmatism a set of ethical diagnoses which are better
suited for the religiously diverse situations it encounters and serves as a method for
creating the groundwork needed to facilitate the clinical pragmatic method. In this way,
the two methods may be able to work in tandem with another as to create a medical
ethical system which is well-rounded in its pluralistic approach.

***
As the above cases have demonstrated, pragmatic perspectivism may be a viable
means of creating a pluralistic bioethics. Its feasibility resides in the fact that it is neither
a normative theory, in the traditional sense of postulating absolute truths or espousing
legalistic ethical prescriptions, nor is it merely a critique of the current state of bioethics
or other bioethical theories. It does not deny the insights and benefits of the various
normative theories which are currently being employed and does not attempt to dismiss
or discard those theories or the progress which they have enabled the field to achieve.
Rather, it is intended to be a practically applicable yet theoretically sound method of
confronting the moral diversity and ethical disagreement that has emerged in bioethics as
a result of the religious and cultural pluralism that pervades our society. Pragmatic
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perspectivism presents us with a new method of engaging and incorporating the views of
the otherwise disparate and opposing perspectives held by those coming from a wide
range of circumstances, including academics, policy-makers, clinicians, and members of
various religions.
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Chapter 5
Summary & Conclusions

Scientific and medical technologies and advancements have had a tremendous
impact on our lives on a variety of levels. The benefits of many of these advancements is
unquestionable however, biomedical technology’s rapid progress has raised a plethora
new ethically challenging questions and moral dilemmas. In addition to providing
humanity with new life-saving capabilities and procedures which have opened up new
possibilities of doing good for others these advancements have forced us to question our
conceptions of life itself and have created practices whose ethical status is uncertain.
Consequently, the interdisciplinary field of bioethics has emerged in an attempt to
resolve some these new ethical dilemmas, to answer some of these difficult and pressing
questions, and ultimately to protect society from the potential harms of biomedical
innovations.
However, the ethical challenges and moral dilemmas which the biomedical
sciences have presented us with have warranted a multitude of responses coming from all
quarters of our social landscape. Aside from responding directly to ethical questions
posed by science, bioethics faces another challenge: those speaking from highly distinct
points of view, including legal, medical and clinical, theological and religious,
philosophical, and anthropological and sociological perspectives wish to have their
voices heard and are all vying for a place within the bioethical arena. As a result,
bioethicists struggle to make sense of these varied and disparate voices in their attempts
to give adequate responses to the biomedical issues themselves.
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Having paid special attention to religious pluralism, the issue of confronting this
moral diversity within a bioethical context has been the topic of our discussion. We have
explored the viability of forging a pluralistic bioethics in which this panoply of distinct
voices may not only be heard but also respected and ultimately represented in the process
of forging policies and principles that are to serve as the guidelines of this new field and
which are meant to protect the different members of our diverse society.
While religio-moral pluralism is indeed a greater social problem extending
beyond the bioethical context, the moral diversity and religious pluralism which pervades
bioethics is rather unique in that, unlike the socio-political arena, many bioethical
questions and problems move beyond the purely moral and social realms. These
bioethical problems do not merely touch upon, but directly raise and engage a wide
variety of metaphysical and ontological questions and concerns. Recognizing this fact,
bioethics has long sought the input of those commentators whose expertise could aid in
the resolution of the various conceptual conundrums that appear time and time again in
this field of inquiry. Hence, as we have seen, philosophers and theologians secured their
place in the field from the outset.
However, with the goal of universal applicability, bioethics has understandably
secularized itself. Holding secular and rational principles begotten from analytic modes
of philosophical thought, and inevitably being highly reliant upon the input of those in
the medical and legal professions, bioethicists have tended to marginalize religious voices
in regards to both public policies and the principles which are meant to guide our actions
and decision-making. Now, while philosophy is definitely well equipped to deal with the
difficult ethical, metaphysical, and ontological issues which biomedical advancements
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have called into question, it is often towards religion that many people turn for answers to
such questions. Hence, as we have seen throughout the course of this study, there have
recently been a series of critiques launched against the more traditional modes of
bioethical deliberation, all of which call attention to and have attempted to provide
solutions for bioethics’ inherent problem of pluralism and the ethical disagreements that
have emerged.
The primary problem that we have been grappling with is what Daniel Callahan
has referred to as the problem of “universalism vs. particularism.” During the course of
this study we have encountered a number of theories and methodological suggestions, all
of which ultimately address this issue. However it has been argued that many of these
methodological attempts to create a more pluralistic bioethics have proved inadequate
when it comes to addressing the complexity of religious beliefs and moral paradigms
which guide many people’s decision-making processes in biomedical ethical contexts.
While all of these methods, including those of the social scientists, contractarians, and
pragmatists, have their merits, it has been suggested that they may not provide the best
means of creating a truly pluralistic bioethical framework and hence, may not be our best
options when attempting to deal with the problem of religious pluralism.
While respectful of the uniqueness of different religious traditions and calling for
the recognition and incorporation of distinct modes of moral reasoning in the bioethical
framework, ethnographic bioethics lacks the normative structure needed to carry out such
a task. Providing a method that avoids universal truth claims and promotes discourse and
consensus, contract theory is still highly reliant upon overly-rationalistic modes of ethical
inquiry, a limited and static notion of agreement, a specific conception of the human self,
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and a particular notion of reasonability which gives rise to an overtly exclusionary
attitude toward a number of religious beliefs. Putting forth a dialogical model of inquiry
that avoids universalism or the discovery of absolute truth, and which encourages an ongoing conception of dialogue and an attitude of inclusiveness, the various forms of
pragmatism are overly reliant upon scientific methodology, neglect the importance of the
metaphysical, and emphasize change in such a manner that they open the door to a
number of potentially exclusionary and disrespectful consequences for religious
traditions.
Attempting to avoid the pitfalls of the aforementioned theories, while attempting
to retain their respective benefits I have attempted to forge a methodology that can walk
the fine line between universalism and particularism and which may serve as the
foundation of a bioethics for a secular yet religiously pluralistic society. Bearing the
name pragmatic perspectivism this method aims to provide bioethics with a dialogical
model of inquiry in which multiple perspectives are represented and in which discourse is
not merely reduced to a conveyance of information. Rather, in this context dialogue is
meant to transcend a particular mode of reasoning as to fully engage the perspective of
the other. This method promotes both consensus and understanding with the realization
that agreement is not always possible and that difference is inescapable and need not be
dissolved or eradicated. Pragmatic perspectivism is being suggested as a means of
creating principles, policies, and guidelines that are adequately representative of the
distinct voices and perspectives which constitute our pluralistic polity. In its endeavor to
do so, this method avoids the quest for absolute truths yet recognizes the practical need
for guiding norms and principles. Having demonstrated its potential to overcome or
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possibly avoid the pitfalls of other methods for dealing with pluralism and having
illustrated its applicability to a number of cases I have maintained that, as a conceptual
framework and methodology, pragmatic perspectivism is a possible means of confronting
religious pluralism and moral diversity in bioethics.
Due to the novelty, complexity, and metaphysical nature of many bioethical
issues, we must have a mutli-perspectival quest for solutions and to the best of our
ability, attempt to accommodate a plurality of religious beliefs and philosophical
positions. What is truly at stake are indeed matters of life and death and questions of the
nature of our existence itself. It is my hope that this methodology will foster constructive
inter-disciplinary and inter-faith dialogue on a range of highly complex and pressing
biomedical ethical issues and will enable the creation of a more pluralistic bioethics.

92
References:

Ainslie, D. C. 2002. Bioethics and the problem of pluralism. Social Philosophy &
Policy Foundation. 19: 1-28.

Arras, J.D. 2003. Rorty’s pragmatism and bioethics. Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy. 28 (5-6): 597-613.

Baker, R. 1998a. A theory of international bioethics: Multiculturalism, postmodernism,
And the bankruptcy of fundamentalism. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal.
8(3): 201-231.

_____. 1998b. A Theory of international bioethics: The negotiable and the
non-negotiable. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. 8(3): 233-273.

Barre, E. A. 2004. Bridging methodologies: Yearley, Stalnaker, and the future of
comparative religious ethics. Comparative Religious Ethics. April.

Bellantoni, L. 2003. What good is a pragmatic bioethic? Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy. 28 (5-6): 615-633.

Breck, J. & L. Breck. 2005. Stage’s on Life’s Way: Orthodox Thinking on Bioethics.
Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press.

Callahan, D. 2000. Universalism & particularism: Fighting to a draw. Hastings Center
Report. 30(1): 37-44.

Chiong, W. 2005. Brain death without definitions. Hastings Center Report. 11: 20-30.

Cooke, E.F. 2003. On the possibility of a pragmatic discourse bioethics: Putman,
Habermas, and the normative logic of bioethical inquiry. Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy. 28(5-6): 635-653.

Eberl, J.T. 2005. A Thomistic understanding of human death. Bioethics. 19(1): 29-48.

93
Fagan, A. 2004. Challenging the bioethical application of the autonomy principle within
multicultural societies. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 21(1): 15-31.

Fan, R. 2002. Reconstructionist Confucianism and health care: An Asian moral account
of health care resource allocation. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 27(6):
675-682.

_____. 2004. Truth telling in medicine: The Confucian view. Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy. 29(2): 179-193.

_____. 2005. A reconstructionist Confucian account of environmentalism: Toward a
human sagely dominion over nature. Journal of Chinese Philosophy. 32(1): 105122.

Fins, J.J., F.G. Miller, M.D. Bacchetta. 1998. Clinical pragmatism: Bridging theory and
practice. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. 8(1): 37-42.

Fins, J.J. 1998. Approximation and negotiation: Clinical pragmatism and difference.
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. 7: 68-76.

Fox, R.C. 2005. Cultural competence and the culture of medicine. New England
Journal of Medicine. 353(13): 1316-1319.
Fulford, KWM. 2004. Neuro-ethics of neuro-values? Delusion and religious experience
as a case study in values-based medicine. Poiesis Praxis. 2: 297-313.

Grodin, M. 1994. Religious exemptions: Brain death and Jewish law. Journal of Church
& State 36(2): 7.

Hatzinikolaou, Fr. N. 2003. Prolonging life or hindering death?: An Orthodox Christian
perspective on death, dying, and euthanasia. Christian Bioethics. 9(2-3): 187-201.

Hedgecoe, A.M. 2004. Critical bioethics: Beyond the social science critique of applied
ethics. Bioethics. 18(2): 120-143.

94
Hester, M.D. 2003. Is pragmatism well-suited to bioethics? Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy. 28(5-6): 545-561.

Hollenbach, D. 1988. Justice, peace and human rights: Chapter 8: Human rights in the
middle east: The impact of religious diversity. Crossroad Press. New York.

Jecker, N.A., J.A. Carrese, & R. Pearlman. 1995. Caring for patients in cross-cultural
settings. The Hastings Center Report, 25 (1): 6-14.

Keown, D. 2001. Buddhism and Bioethics. New York, New York: Palgrave Publishing.

Kerridge I.H., P. Saul, M. Lowe, J. McPhee, D. Williams. 2002. Death, dying and
donation: organ transplantation and the diagnosis of death. Journal of Medical
Ethics 28(2): 89-94.
Kuhn, T. 1996. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 3rd Ed. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press.

Lazar, N.M., S. Shemie, G.C. Webster, B.M. Dickens. 2001. Canadian Medical
Association Journal (CMAJ). 164 (6): 833-836.

Lewis, T.A., J.W. Schofer, A. Stalnaker, M.A. Berkson. 2005. Journal of Religious
Ethics. 33(2): 177-185.

Lewis, T.A. 2005. Frames of comparison: Anthropology and inheriting traditional
practices. Journal of Religious Ethics. 33(2): 225-253.

Marias, J., F.M. López-Morillas, trans. 1970. Jose Ortega y Gasset: Circumstance and
Vocation. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Marshall, P.A. 1992. Anthropology and bioethics. Medical Anthropology Quarterly.
6(1): 49-73.

Messikomer, C.M., R.C. Fox, J.P. Swazey. 2001. The presence and influence of religion
in American bioethics. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. 44(4): 485-508.

95

McGee, G. 2003. Pragmatic Bioethics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Ouimette, V. 1982. Jose Ortega y Gasset. Boston: Twayne Publishers.
Pence, G.E. 2004. Classic Cases in Medical Ethics, 4th Ed. New York, NY: McGraw
Hill Companies.

Rasmussen, L.M. 2000. Morality, religion and metaphysics: diverse visions in bioethics.
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 25(4): 367-377.

Sadler, J. Z. 2004. Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.

Smith, A.L. Jr. 2000. Personhood: Beginnings and endings. Christian Bioethics. 6(1):
3-14.

Stalnaker, A. 2005. Comparative religious ethics and the problem of “human nature”.
Journal of Religious Ethics. 33(2): 187-224.

Stout, J. 2001. Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

_____. 2004. Democracy and Tradition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Turner, L. 2003. Bioethics in a multicultural world: Medicine and morality in pluralistic
settings. Health Care Analysis. 11(2): 99-117. June.

_____. 2003. Bioethics and religions: Religious traditions and understandings of
morality, health, and illness. Health Care Analysis. 11(3): 181-197. September.

_____. 2004. Bioethics in pluralistic societies. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy.
7: 201-208.

96

Veatch, R.M. 1993. Impending collapse of the whole-brain definition of death. Hastings
Center Report. 23: 18-24

_____. 1999. The foundations of bioethics. Bioethics. 13(3-4): 206-217.

Warnock, M. 2005. Public policy in bioethics and inviolable principles. Studies in
Christian Ethics. 18(1): 33-41.

Younger, S.J., Arnold, R.M.. Schapiro, R. Eds. 1999. Definition of Death:
Contemporary Controversies. Johns Hopkins University Press.

